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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY OTHER MEANS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF 
U.S. MILITARY MESSAGES IN POLISH NEWS OUTLETS 
Leslie Gibson 
 
Abstract 
 
The United States military’s global presence presents a unique opportunity to engage 
foreign publics in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. This thesis identifies the message 
the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through public diplomacy activities, and how 
this message is perceived in Polish news outlets. This case also creates linkage between the 
military and public diplomacy, an actor and a strategy that can seem contradictory. 
Through interviews with government officials and the application of a two-step 
methodology of content and qualitative discourse analyses to Polish news articles, this 
thesis finds that Polish news outlets favorably perceive U.S. military public diplomacy, and 
that the message of reassurance and deterrence is conveyed through the activities. The 
military and public diplomacy are compatible in practice and the combination can result in 
an effective strategy to communicate with foreign audiences. By applying constructivist 
assertions to concepts of perception and soft power that traditionally fit into other 
theoretical fields, this thesis contributes to the development of military public diplomacy as 
a salient academic topic that can offer insight into future cases of militaries conducting 
public diplomacy.  
 
Key words: public diplomacy, military public diplomacy, U.S. military, Poland, 
reassurance, deterrence, constructivism, perception, soft power 
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SUMMARY  
The United States military’s global presence presents a unique opportunity to engage 
foreign publics in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. In the current Euro-Atlantic security 
environment on NATO’s “eastern flank,” the U.S. military’s presence allows opportunities 
to engage with publics in Eastern Europe to enhance its image and convince allies of U.S. 
commitment to their security. Despite the increasingly important role the military has in 
Poland, however, the military and public diplomacy still seem to represent a contradiction 
to policymakers and academics, which is evident in the lack of clear Department of 
Defense definitions and relevant academic literature. This thesis identifies the message the 
U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through public diplomacy activities, and how this 
message is perceived in Polish news outlets. This case also creates linkage between the 
military and public diplomacy, an actor and a strategy that can seem contradictory. Poland 
is selected from the countries on the eastern flank for this thesis, as Poland hosts the largest 
number of U.S. troops and the U.S. Army Europe’s Operation Atlantic Resolve 
headquarters. The U.S. military’s posture in Poland also represents a case of military 
public diplomacy in a fellow NATO ally country, which is understudied in academic 
literature and can offer insight into how effectively the military engages with its allies. The 
U.S. military public diplomacy events and Polish news articles from spring 2014 to 
summer 2017 are examined and represent a critical time frame in U.S. defense posture on 
NATO’s eastern flank and in Poland. The resources available to determine the military 
public diplomacy strategy, curate articles from the diverse Polish media landscape, and 
conduct research during a limited time frame narrow the scope of this thesis, making the 
results representative, but not all encompassing. 
 
Two research questions structure the methodology and empirical data analysis: 1. What is 
the primary message U.S. military public diplomacy is communicating to Poland? and 2. 
How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? On a theoretical level, 
public diplomacy literature is lacking in supporting theories to answer these questions, 
which makes a constructivist framework a potentially valuable way of approaching 
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military public diplomacy. The first question requires examining official U.S. government 
policies through supporting data from interviews with government representatives and 
documents. To answer the second question, a sample of Polish news articles is drawn from 
a range of sources and broken down through content analysis and qualitative discourse 
analysis, a two-step methodology that allows multiple perspectives into what the articles 
mean. This thesis finds that Polish news outlets favorably perceive U.S. military public 
diplomacy, and that the message of reassurance and deterrence is conveyed through the 
activities.  
 
Military public diplomacy fits into neither hard power nor soft power neatly, yet occupies a 
combination of the two that can be answered by analyzing perceptions and images. The 
results of the thesis have practical implications for convincing policymakers of the 
potential added value of the military in conveying a message. Additionally, constructivism 
proves a valuable theoretical construct to create a linkage between perception and soft 
power to apply to military public diplomacy. Rather than positioning concepts within 
realist and liberalist schools of thought as in conflict with constructivism, this case shows 
the compatibility among the theoretical frameworks to answer questions regarding military 
public diplomacy. This linkage can benefit the academic field of public diplomacy, and 
shows that the military is a valid actor that should be considered more seriously in public 
diplomacy literature. Other cases of militaries conducting public diplomacy can adopt 
constructivist assertions to identify its messaging strategies and their effectiveness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. military maintains an extensive presence across the world at overseas bases, in 
conflict zones, and in potential hotspots. The global nature and scale of the United States’ 
defense posture make the military a serious actor in pursuing the country’s foreign policy 
objectives. In order to secure the operational environments related to U.S. foreign policy, 
the military regularly practices in public diplomacy – that is, engaging with foreign publics 
through outreach and targeted communication channels, otherwise known as public 
diplomacy. While the Department of State oversees traditional public diplomacy, the 
military is uniquely poised to engage with audiences during foreign deployments and 
rotations, making its role in public diplomacy efforts crucial to effectiveness. In the current 
Euro-Atlantic security environment on NATO’s “eastern flank,” the U.S. military’s 
presence allows opportunities to engage with publics in the region, especially in Poland, to 
enhance its image and convince allies of U.S. commitment to their security. Despite the 
increasingly important role the military has in Poland, however, the military and public 
diplomacy still seem to represent a contradiction to policymakers and academics, which is 
evident in the lack of any clear definitions to date, either by the Department of Defense 
itself or in the  relevant academic literature.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to connect the military and public diplomacy rather than framing 
the two as incompatible. By analyzing both the U.S. military’s messages and the ways in 
which they are perceived in news outlets, this thesis will contribute to the empirical 
literature public diplomacy empirical literature and show that military public diplomacy is 
a salient concept. Poland is selected from the countries on the eastern flank for this thesis, 
as Poland hosts the largest number of U.S. troops in the region, and is home to the 
headquarters of  U.S. Army Europe’s Operation Atlantic Resolve. The U.S. military’s 
posture in Poland also represents a case of military public diplomacy in a  NATO member  
an  understudied type of case that can offer insight into how effectively the military 
engages with its allies. U.S. military public diplomacy efforts and news articles from 
spring 2014 to summer 2017 are examined and represent a critical time frame in U.S. 
defense posture on NATO’s eastern flank in general, especially in Poland. The resources 
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available to determine military public diplomacy strategy, curate articles from the diverse 
Polish media landscape, and conduct research during a limited time frame narrow the 
scope of this thesis, making the results representative, but not all-encompassing.  
 
Two research questions structure the methodology and empirical data analysis: first,  what 
is the primary message communicated to Poland by U.S. military public diplomacy, and 
second, how is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? On a theoretical 
level, the public diplomacy literature lacks relevant theories to answer these questions, 
making a constructivist framework a potentially valuable way of approaching military 
public diplomacy. To answer the first, official U.S. government policies are [have been] 
examined through supporting data from interviews with government representatives as 
well as through document analysis. To answer the second question, a sample of Polish 
news articles are drawn from a range of sources and broken down through content analysis 
and qualitative discourse analysis, a two-step methodology that allows multiple 
perspectives into what the articles represent.  
   
This thesis is divided into four main sections. The first provides a theoretical foundation 
for analysis by using a constructivist framework to understand how perceptions, images, 
and soft power affect public diplomacy and subsequently military public diplomacy and its 
messages. The second chapter provides an overview of relevant empirical data and the 
methodology used to analyze the research questions and includes an outline of limitations. 
An empirical background follows the methodology chapter and explains why the U.S. 
military is in Poland while situating specific public diplomacy events in the general context 
of  relations between the United States and Poland. The empirical data is analyzed and 
discussed in the fourth chapter, which presents and discusses the main findings of  this 
thesis.  Finally, a conclusion summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis and 
theoretical contributions.  
 
The findings of the analysis show that the U.S. military seeks to convey a message of 
reassurance to its NATO allies – while simultaneously deterring Russian aggression – 
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through  its public diplomacy events and that this message is perceived favorably in Polish 
news outlets. These results also reveal/demonstrate an important linkage between the 
military and public diplomacy, while underscoring that the military plays a key role in 
communicating a state’s message to foreign audiences. 
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CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Public diplomacy is a foreign policy strategy that focuses on engagement with foreign 
audiences and is typically understood as a way of increasing a state’s soft power. 
Policymakers and academics see the military’s role in foreign policy strictly as ensuring 
security, yet the military adds a different dimension to public diplomacy. A framework for 
understanding the U.S. military’s message and how it is perceived is constructivism, which 
argues that the contexts that produce ideas, behaviors, and interests are socially 
constructed. These create images of a state that determine how others frame its behavior. 
The range of perceptions that result from certain actions can either effectively contribute to 
a state’s soft power or damage the state’s reputation and credibility. Controlling how an 
image is perceived requires strategic planning and implementation, which is where public 
diplomacy fits into a state’s foreign policy projection. How the military contributes to 
managing perceptions through the respective government’s public diplomacy strategies 
will be explored through the following chapter on the theoretical conceptualization of these 
topics.  
1.1. Constructivism as a Foundation for Analysis 
Constructivism, at its core, argues that social relations (and how these relations are formed) 
shape the world and form the foundation for how foreign policy decisions are implemented 
and perceived. The characterization and perception of the U.S. military’s public diplomacy 
in Polish media rely on a complex web of social structures that builds up images of all 
actors involved. These images lead to the actor’s behavior and how that behavior is 
perceived. One of the leading constructivist scholars, Alexander Wendt, asserts that 
“constructivist theorizing tries to show how the social structure of a system makes actions 
possible by constituting actors with certain identities and interests, and material 
capabilities with certain meanings” (1995, p. 76). In the context of international relations, a 
state is associated with a range of identities that influence how others interact with the state 
as well as how the state forms its interests and behaves according to these interests.  
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These social structures and the embedded web of shared ideas and behaviors within an 
international system result either in an image, a representation or impression, of a specific 
actor. Constructivist thinkers assume that these images, or socially-constructed “webs of 
meaning and practices,” can be stable but tend to be subject to change (Hurd, 2008, p. 
300). In other words, actor images and behaviors are not fixed: they can fluctuate 
depending on the nature of other interactions among actors. In addition to the fluctuating 
meaning of the contexts that determine images, constructivist scholars maintain that the 
social structures that compose these webs of shared meaning and practices include material 
resources, but that these materials obtain their power through social behavior and action 
(Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, 
regard the military as a material capability that the state uses to project power;  however, 
this is overly simplistic as it ignores what the military’s image means and how these 
constructed images subsequently affect others’ perception of  a state’s military capabilities. 
Recognizing the absence of explanations for the military’s image in public diplomacy in 
traditional schools of thought, this thesis relies on constructivism – the assertion that the 
world is socially constructed – as the most relevant theoretical concept to answer the 
research questions and puzzle. This thesis proposes that the fluctuating intersubjective 
meanings that define how actors interact can show how the military constructs its message 
and how that output is perceived by the Polish news media.  
1.2. Perception (and Misperception) 
A world constructed from such social interactions relies heavily on perception, or how an 
actor regards and understands the other(s). In this thesis, perceptions are at play in two 
stages in particular: understanding the input – what the U.S. military’s views as the core 
public diplomacy message – and analyzing its reception in Polish news outlets. Robert 
Jervis pioneered the development of perception as a theoretical concept in the second half 
of the 20th century and provided insight into misperceptions that also play a significant 
role in international relations, especially in war and in attempts to deter adversaries from 
war. Typically, perception as a concept fits into the theoretical field of liberalism and 
explains how misperception guided foreign policy decisions, especially during World War 
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II and the Cold War. Constructivism, in contrast, gained more saliency in academia in the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries as it adapted a way of framing international relations 
using social structures as a basis. There is an ongoing debate about whether these two 
frameworks are in conflict, or whether constructivism as a way of thinking – as opposed to 
a theory – can add value to traditional schools of thought. This thesis takes the position that 
constructivist assertions, such as the fluid nature of images, can answer questions about 
perception previously unanswered in realist approaches. It does not argue, however, that 
the two theoretical frames are incompatible, but simply holds that in the context of this 
thesis,  constructivism does add value to understanding perceptions of U.S. military public 
diplomacy in Polish media.  
 
Despite the difference in theoretical categorization, similarities between how perception 
and socially-constructed images are formed call for a new way of approaching certain 
topics. Constructivist thinking implies that states and other agents are constituted with 
certain images that in turn affect actor behavior. Similarly, in Jervis’ words, “in 
determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how 
their actions will affect his values” (Jervis, 1968, p. 454). These predictions are based on 
what a state is imagined to be. This shows that both concepts assert that how a state is 
imagined affects the ways in which  others base their interactions. Another similarity 
between perception and constructed images becomes evident: both assume that actors 
engage in subjective interpretations of the world around them that are fluid. Socially-
constructed images of a state are subject to change based on fluctuating interpretations, just 
as perception depends on changing circumstances and interactions. Perception, similar to 
images of an actor, is neither rational nor based on hard facts, but instead relies on 
interactions and how these interactions leave impressions on actors. This does not mean 
that an actor’s perception is irrational or false, just that it relies on a range of sources – 
many at the personal level of individual policymakers – that influence the understanding 
and interpretation of another. Jervis asserts that perception (and misperception) results 
from three sources that contribute to levels of “perceptual thresholds.” These three sources 
are:  
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1) An actor’s beliefs about the present domestic political structure; 
2) Previous experiences; 
3) And views of international relations and international history (1968).  
These sources differ for both key actors at the center of this thesis: the U.S. military 
(representing the United States) and Polish media (representing Poland).  
 
The U.S. domestic political system is based on a set of guiding – democratic – values. 
These domestic values have steadily been transferred into foreign policy in the form of 
presidential doctrines, for example, that leave the world with various impressions of the 
United States, both positive and negative. This feedback creates a certain self-image in the 
United States, as well as influences how actors external to an interaction perceive the U.S. 
For the United States, perceptions of not only Poland and NATO but also Russia play a 
role in the formation of its military public diplomacy message in Poland. Past experiences 
in international history, especially in the Cold War, as well as the current geopolitical 
climate also impact the way the United States perceives Russia and Poland. Since the 
United States believes Russia’s image is one of an aggressive actor based on historical 
expectations, then its suspicion of Russia frames its perceptions. On the other hand, if the 
United States views Poland as a reliable and staunch NATO ally, its behavior and 
messaging will reflect such impressions.  
 
Poland, although ideologically aligned with the United States in many ways, is a unique 
actor with a different domestic political system and set of previous experiences. Poland’s 
domestic discourse that promotes a strong, secure, and free Poland can explain its current 
dedication to protecting NATO’s eastern flank from Russian aggression. Decades of Soviet 
oppression during the Cold War heavily influences this self-image. Since Poland views the 
United States as a reliable guarantor of security against Russia, its reception to U.S. 
behavior will be accordingly favorable. To Warsaw, past experiences and current relations, 
such as the strong defense relationship and the symbols of commitment the U.S. continues 
to deliver to Poland, constitute its the image of the United States. Poland will perceive the 
United States military based on what they expect from the United States: if Poland expects 
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a strong message of solidarity from the U.S., the more likely Poland will perceive what the 
U.S. military does as consonant with expectation of solidarity. These social contexts based 
on expectations and perceptions are relevant in answering both research questions this 
thesis seeks to answer. The first relates to the U.S. military’s message: how the U.S. 
perceives international actors creates and maintains this message. The second question 
aims at understanding perception directly: how the media views the message.  
 
Perception is not just about liking or disliking another state, but a complex array of 
expectations and contexts that construct certain meaning and fluctuate over time. Actors 
will perceive another actor based on what it expects from that actor, and frame its actions 
on this perception. Favorable perceptions and maintaining favorable perceptions matter in 
being an effective actor. A range of factors like its overall attractiveness to another – also 
known as soft power – determines the formation of a favorable perception.  
1.3. Soft Power, Hard Power, Smart Power?  
Image again plays a key role in solving part of the puzzle of this thesis: the connection 
between the military and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is often associated with the 
concept of soft power or “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” A state’s culture, political values, and 
foreign policies, as well as – acknowledged more recently – economic capabilities form the 
basis for attraction (Nye 2004, p. 94; 2011). Examples of U.S. soft power include the 
image of the Statue of Liberty welcoming immigrants, the globalization of American rock 
music, and the innovation in Silicon Valley. Public diplomacy does not equal soft power, 
and vice versa. Soft power is attraction, while public diplomacy is an influence strategy 
that fits into generating a state’s soft power. The examples of soft power mentioned are 
merely assets the United States holds that contribute to its appeal, rather than government 
strategies created to improve the country’s image. Hard power, in contrast to soft power, 
relates to the use of resources like military capabilities to project power, yet “sticks and 
carrots” are not mutually exclusive. Joseph Nye further develops concepts of power by 
dubbing the strategic use of hard and soft power as “smart power.” Yet smart power, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
combination of military capabilities and soft elements, does not explain military public 
diplomacy. Military public diplomacy is a separate influence strategy than just power 
projection through just the military (element of hard power) or just public diplomacy 
(element of soft power). Military power traditionally fits into the realist schools of thought 
yet how the military acquires an image, significance, and meaning should be examined 
through a constructivist framework. Power is based on how states perceive others, which is 
founded on webs of meanings and images that define what power is and who holds it. A 
constructivist assertion such as “meaning, through social contexts. endows material 
capabilities with power,” shows that the military is more than just a tool to coerce behavior 
– it is also an instrument of influencing perceptions. Military public diplomacy reflects 
this, as the military’s image depends on others’ perceptions of its tangible assets, such as 
soldiers and heavy military equipment.  
 
Imagery and perception form the basis for attraction, something that is founded on 
interactions between actors. Soft power alone in itself is not sufficient to improve an 
actor’s image in the eyes of another actor, but instead builds upon existing perceptions that 
actor holds. If a mismatch exists between perception and how a state projects its power, the 
attempt to attract and convince another state will not be effective. Attraction – soft power – 
is not a strategy in itself. Designing instruments to achieve soft power requires an actor to 
understand its image, and then use soft and hard power tools to either improve or maintain 
this image. The United States’ soft power potential effectiveness will be influenced by the 
sources of perception discussed – its domestic political system, past experiences, and 
international relations and history. The United States will not be attractive to audiences 
with negative perceptions of American influence. As a strategy, soft power is not enough 
to convince these averse audiences. For example, for a state such as Afghanistan with past 
experiences of an American invasion, Hollywood movies are not enough to attract 
audiences to support a given U.S. cause. As a strategy, public diplomacy, is more effective 
as it can identify elements of how the audiences perceive the United States and plan 
engagement to address issues and apply cultural awareness.  
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The military is a public diplomacy instrument in accruing soft power, yet it does not 
explain military public diplomacy in the way traditional diplomacy can be nested under the 
soft power concept. Nye identified the influential role of the military in generating soft 
power through officer exchange programs, joint training exercises, and aid programs that 
combine the “aura of power” associated with the military’s hard power capabilities with 
the soft power element of people-to-people contact (2004, p. 106). Soft power also plays 
an important role in the use of force: “soft power supports the exercise of military and hard 
economic powers, and arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power” 
(Hocking, 2005, p. 32). However, an aura of power is not a strategy, and these events 
require concerted amplification to message within a certain context. In the case of Poland, 
the U.S. military does not aim to generate attraction, but instead uses public diplomacy to 
address and evaluate Polish concerns of an existential threat from Russia with strategies to 
maintain favorable perceptions.  
 
Soft power is power through attraction – which can be a more passive action – while 
public diplomacy involves government intention: strategic planning and agenda-setting to 
foster this attraction. The definitions and conceptualization outlined in subsequent sections 
reveal that military public diplomacy activities are not only aimed at creating a soft 
attraction, but instead are strategically crafted as a way of securing operational 
environments that enhance the United States’ national security. As discussed, images and 
perceptions, as well as other elements such as a state’s cultural resources and values, 
constitute soft power. The following sections conceptualize public diplomacy and military 
public diplomacy, which is the key topic under study for this thesis, in attempts to 
distinguish characteristics of (and bridge the confusion in categorizing) military public 
diplomacy. 
1.4. Conceptualizing Public Diplomacy 
As images are a key element of soft power, they prove logically relevant in 
conceptualizing public diplomacy. “Interests, values, identities, memories, and geostrategic 
contexts shape how we think about public diplomacy” and are socially-constructed 
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contexts by which “states, associations of states, and nonstate actors understand cultures, 
attitudes and behavior; manage relations; and influence opinions and actions to advance 
their interests and values” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). In other words, the socially-constructed 
contexts directly influence how a state strategizes its public diplomacy policies.  
 
Laying the foundations for public diplomacy and contributing academic concepts is 
necessary to develop the concept of military public diplomacy, as it draws upon traditional 
models of public diplomacy and overlaps with a variety of fields. A problem that arises in 
using a case that focuses on government and academic language is the discrepancy 
between words and phrases in common use and those same words and phrases in 
academia. The following section includes definitional elements of public diplomacy and 
builds upon those to develop a holistic understanding of military public diplomacy in order 
to best conceptualize the term for this thesis and form the basis for empirical analysis. 
While this thesis does not attempt to align with a certain dictionary, whether academic or 
governmental, empirical data such as interviews with officials revealed that the 
terminology used matters, especially in the military. Public diplomacy as a theoretical field 
is underdeveloped, and  does not fit neatly into traditional international relations, 
diplomacy, communication, or public relations theories. Public diplomacy as a term and 
official practice gained relevance in academia in the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviet 
Union engaged in “cultural offensives.” However, this context no longer captures the full 
nature of public diplomacy, not least military public diplomacy; accordingly,  this thesis 
seeks to add a more complete on modern public diplomacy.  
 
United States public diplomacy, according to the Department of State, is intended “to 
support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national 
interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and 
by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of 
the United States and citizens of the rest of the world” (Department of State, 2018). This 
State Department definition includes a specific goal – to enhance national security. 
Similarly, the U.S. military’s principal aim is to secure the country and its national 
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interests. These identified goals of two key government actors contribute to the image of 
the United States: how the country sees itself affects how others perceive its behavior.  
 
Defining public diplomacy as a concept within academic literature proves more 
challenging. Eytan Gilboa (2008) outlines the process of defining public diplomacy, and 
what early definitions lacked in explaining public diplomacy. The questions surrounding 
who the actors are and what they do are two points of difficulty in reaching a consensual 
definition. There is no  universal academic definition because of disagreements in the 
differences between strategic communications and public diplomacy, an argument about 
whether public diplomacy is simply public relations, and the assertion that the information 
age has brought a new form of public diplomacy (Banks, 2011). This thesis adopts Michael 
McClellan’s (2004, para. 5) definition of public diplomacy as “the strategic planning and 
execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country 
to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable 
target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's 
foreign policy objectives.” McClellan’s definition is holistic, as it identifies the actor, 
actions, goals, and target, answering the problematic questions. However, as it is still a 
wordy definition, it can be summarized as: a country’s strategy to conduct information, 
cultural, and educational programming to create favorable foreign public opinion to that 
country’s foreign policy.  
 
After defining the term, outlining public diplomacy practices and actor responsibilities 
reveals the complexities in identifying where the military fits into the public diplomacy 
model. Bruce Gregory characterizes public diplomacy operations through “actions, 
relationships, images, and words in three time frames: 24/7 news streams, medium-range 
campaigns on high-value policies, and long-term engagement” (2008, p. 276). This 
description matches Nye’s (2004) outline of the three dimensions of how public diplomacy 
is implemented: daily communication, strategic communication, and the development of 
lasting relationships. A classic example of U.S. public diplomacy may include: daily social 
media posts in the host country’s language, outreach events planned in minority 
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communities, and promoting cultural and educational exchanges. These activities are all 
based on interactions that lead to meanings that that become embedded in others’ 
perceptions of the United States. While these activities contribute to the United States’ 
attractiveness to – or its soft power in –  a certain community or audience, these activities 
involve a level of strategic planning to reach certain goals of enhancing the country’s  
image that make the conditions globally more favorable to American national security. 
They also require a sustained level of commitment to maintaining positive impressions, as 
factors exogenous to public diplomacy can influence the image of the United States. These 
characteristics are true for military public diplomacy as well, even though the way in 
which the U.S. military implements public diplomacy differs from the standard public 
diplomacy model. 
 
Important in the evaluation of a foreign policy strategy like public diplomacy is public 
opinion, or the collection of individual attitudes. Public opinion polls gained importance 
during the Cold War, when American pollsters began surveying foreign publics about 
perceptions of the U.S., among other indicators. Public opinion is a crucial element of the 
strategic planning and evaluation of public diplomacy, as evidenced by Gallup and 
Nielsen’s consultancy of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. In the 
context of military public diplomacy, what public opinion reveals is how Poland perceives 
the American military. This public opinion in turn shapes how leaders direct troops to 
interact with local audiences and which elements of the military are promoted.  
1.4.1. Where Does Public Diplomacy Fit?  
Public diplomacy lacks a defined scholarly field and does not neatly fit into other fields, 
leaving room for a constructivist framework to contribute to its theoretical development. 
As previously discussed, an actor’s socially-constructed image leads to perceptions that 
lead to public diplomacy strategies. Although public diplomacy has become a standard 
foreign policy tool for many states, it seems to assimilate concepts from a range of fields, 
such as communications, marketing, public relations, and diplomacy theories. Most public 
diplomacy research is historical, with particular emphasis devoted to examining the Cold 
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War period. Contemporary research expands past Cold War paradigms, however, U.S. 
public diplomacy research largely focuses on the post-9/11 era and the war on terrorism. 
Cold War-era theoretical examinations of public diplomacy utilized, for example, media 
and political communication, psychology, and public opinion research. Additionally, 
academic research topics on public diplomacy, in many cases, fell into two categories: U.S. 
Information Agency and institutional activities, and the struggle of ideologies between the 
U.S. and USSR  (Gregory, 2008, p. 281). The most relevant and recent research on military 
public diplomacy includes work by Matthew Wallin (2015) and Haluk Karadag (2017), yet 
neither focuses on specific cases similar to the U.S. military in Poland. The concepts 
described below, offer elements that can contribute to the underdeveloped concept of 
military public diplomacy. It also adds another perspective of public diplomacy relations 
between NATO allies with favorable public opinion environments, as opposed to 
traditional studies of public diplomacy that focus on more hostile or adversarial 
environments.  
 
New Public Diplomacy Concept 
One of the leaps made at the turn of the century strived to develop “new public diplomacy” 
as a concept to replace traditional academic constructs of public diplomacy. Jan Melissen 
(2005) defines a “new public diplomacy” to distinguish public diplomacy from traditional 
diplomacy in response to the decentralization of information through developments in 
communications technology. What is lacking in McClellan’s earlier-presented definition of 
public diplomacy, is the vagueness of where non-government actors fit as agents of public 
diplomacy. Melissen argues that non-state actors have an important role in public 
diplomacy activities, however, many of these non-state actors in democratic countries are 
endowed power through governments, either through funding or cooperation. Other 
characteristics of new public diplomacy include the blurring of differentiation between 
public affairs and public diplomacy and the trend that information flows are no longer a 
one-way communications effort but a bilateral process of engaging in dialogue. 
Developments in the information age have undoubtedly affected military public 
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diplomacy, but what the “new public diplomacy” fails to explain is how and where the 
military fits into the model. 
 
Public Relations, Marketing, and Communications Theories 
Public relations theories can offer theoretical guidance to public diplomacy and have done 
so in many cases (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013). Concepts and theoretical 
frames in public relations, such as relationship management theory and persuasion 
theories, can help explain public diplomacy strategies and how engagement is approached 
as relationship management and as a means to influence. The key difference in public 
relations and public diplomacy is that public relations primarily concerns the individual 
affairs of a company or organization, while public diplomacy concerns policies and 
legislation. Some see public diplomacy as an application of marketing principles to 
government communication with foreign audiences (Melissen, 2005). Nation-branding 
strategies to appeal to foreign audiences, for example, reflect marketing theories applied to 
the field of international relations. In the case of nation-branding, public diplomacy is 
employed to accrue soft power, i.e. to attract, rather than send a certain message. Nation-
branding also focuses on attracting others to visit, invest in, and engage with a certain 
country, whereas public diplomacy is focused on convincing another state to align with its 
foreign policy. Additionally, in terms of how public diplomacy is implemented, theories 
involving communications and public relations theories are valuable. Communications 
theories applied to international relations, however, focus primarily on the role of media. 
Political communications theories better evaluate linkages between media coverage and 
policy. Theories of political communication represent potential opportunities to extend the 
research presented here. 
 
Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy Theories 
Diplomacy focuses on relationships between representatives of states or international 
institutions, while public diplomacy’s purpose is to persuade a foreign public – not 
necessarily political institutions – in order for the foreign country to advocate on behalf of 
the actor’s foreign policies. Melissen argues that existing definitions of diplomacy identify 
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its main purpose as resolving international difficulties peacefully, with its principal agents 
accredited representatives of sovereign states who manage international relations through 
negotiation (2005, p. 5). What diplomacy studies fail to capture is that roles and actions are 
not as clearly delineated in public diplomacy activities as they are in traditional diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy, while an element of the larger diplomacy umbrella, differs in its 
definition: its agent is a country, but rather than official accredited diplomats, public 
diplomacy can be carried out more with more informal representatives. For example, in 
U.S. public diplomacy, embassies establish American Corners that host open spaces of 
resources related to American culture. These American Corners are not aimed at  achieving 
political dialogue at a state-to-state level, but rather to promote the United States in a more 
publicly-accessible setting. Additionally, reactions to the global information age leave 
diplomacy studies moving toward a more collaborative model, one that requires public 
diplomacy and the engagement of these informal representatives. Within diplomacy 
literature itself, concepts of military diplomacy include gunboat diplomacy and coercive 
diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy is the “use of limited naval force for political objectives” 
and has its theoretical roots in bargaining, signaling, and force theories (Mandel, 1986, p. 
59). In this thesis’ case, the U.S. military is not engaging in acts of force to achieve 
political objectives in Poland. The U.S.–Polish relationship is one of strong bilateral ties 
between NATO allied countries, as opposed to cases of gunboat and coercive diplomacy 
where relations are more antagonistic and sometimes violent. The specific case under study 
is a non-traditional form of public diplomacy and diplomacy, bridging elements of various 
theoretical frameworks to explain the diplomatic aspects of international relations.  
1.5. Military Public Diplomacy 
Non-violent methods to pursue security-related foreign policy goals characterize military 
public diplomacy. This thesis seeks to connect the concept of military public diplomacy to 
certain theoretical frameworks and concepts. Building upon explanations of perception and 
images in public diplomacy and its relatively underdeveloped theoretical field, a 
conceptualization of military public diplomacy is presented. A better empirical 
understanding of U.S. military public diplomacy in Poland will focus on what military 
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public diplomacy is and how it is implemented. The military imagines its responsibility as 
one of defending national security and projects this self-image abroad through military 
interventions, troop deployment, and peace-building operations. Its responsibility to 
national security also influences how the government shapes messages to convey to 
foreign audiences: each message must have some relevance for improving the state of 
American security. As the United States executive branch (which includes both, the 
Department of Defense and Department of State), is designed to implement presidential 
administration policies, an important element of both U.S. traditional and military public 
diplomacy is to coordinate and disseminate the same general message in order to prevent 
information fratricide. This separation of responsibilities but alignment of messages 
explains the complexity of the language sometimes used in official contexts.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to note that the U.S. military utilizes working 
definitions that may differ from how public diplomacy and related topics are defined in 
academic literature. However, interviews and conversations with officials revealed that 
public diplomacy is regularly used to describe certain U.S. military activities. As one of the 
central focal points in this thesis, clarifying the concept of military public diplomacy, 
especially differentiating it from public diplomacy, military diplomacy, and traditional 
diplomacy, is necessary. This section will develop the concept using frameworks and 
definitions of the aforementioned concepts. A key point of divergence from other 
conceptual public diplomacy frames is that – whereas traditional U.S. public diplomacy 
can involve actors at various levels – U.S. military public diplomacy focuses on the 
military as the actor utilizing public diplomacy tools. Military diplomacy can be seen as a 
broader umbrella for military public diplomacy, but focuses on more activities related to 
information gathering and psychological operations, for example. Military diplomacy is “a 
set of non-combat activities of military and civilian forces of the ministry of defense 
focused on the pursuit of foreign-policy objectives that are part of the overall state 
diplomacy” (Pajtinka, 2016, p. 183). The agents involved are members of the defense 
department, either civilian or servicemen, as well as officials with the power to execute 
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security and defense policy. Erik Pajtinka (2016) outlines the five functions of military 
diplomacy: 
1) Gathering and analyzing information on the armed forces and the security 
situation in the receiving state 
2) Promotion of cooperation, communication, and mutual relations between the 
armed forces of the sending and the receiving state 
3) Organization of the working visits of the representatives of the defense 
authorities and of peaceful stay of the military units of the sending state in the 
receiving state 
4) Support of business contracts with arms and military equipment between the 
sending and the receiving state 
5) Representation of the sending state and its armed forces at official ceremonies 
and other official events in the receiving state 
Military public diplomacy is an element of military diplomacy, in that it contributes to 
non-violent relationship building between the armed forces and other actors, however, not 
all identified functions are an appropriate characterization of military public diplomacy. 
Most applicable to understanding military public diplomacy is the second characteristic – 
to promote cooperation and communication – that improves the perception of the military 
in the eyes of the receiving state. For example, the United States uses military exercises to 
work on NATO interoperability at the military-to-military level; this cooperation leads to 
greater cohesion among allied militaries. Military public diplomacy, however, also focuses 
on the foreign “public” aspect rather than focusing on the armed forces of a receiving state, 
making this concept mostly disregarded in military diplomacy studies. This further leads to 
the inability to classify military public diplomacy as either hard or soft power.  
 
In official Department of Defense documents, the term “public diplomacy” is referenced 
inconsistently in comparison to Department of State public diplomacy documents that 
explicitly define the term. Many Department of Defense activities fit the previously 
discussed definition of public diplomacy, and interviews and conversations with officials 
reveal that it is used in vernacular. For example, the 2009 DoD Report on Strategic 
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Communication delegated responsibility for “strategic communications, public diplomacy, 
and public affairs” to an organizational board for the purposes of “providing strategic 
direction for Department of Defense efforts related to strategic communications and public 
diplomacy; and setting priorities for the Department of Defense in the areas of strategic 
communications and public diplomacy” (p. 2). In the DoD dictionaries from 2010-2017, 
public diplomacy is explicitly defined as:  
“1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States  
Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by 
seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, 
and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and 
their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote 
an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility 
through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations” (Department 
of Defense, 2017, p. 192) 
 
In the 2018 DoD dictionary removed “public diplomacy” with the rationale of “not used” 
and instead placed into a separate document designated as “Peace Operations.” The 
dictionary instead uses DSPD or “defense support to public diplomacy” (Department of 
Defense 2018, pp. 288, 387). The inconsistency in official publications is most likely to 
maintain the division of responsibilities between the State and Defense departments, as 
well as to create deniability if an activity strays from what is considered public diplomacy 
as the operational environment changes. For simplicity and consistency’s sake, however, 
this thesis uses the term “military public diplomacy.” Matthew Wallin, in search for a 
better understanding of military PD, outlines the terminology difficulties of military public 
diplomacy and provides a definition: “military communication and relationship building 
with foreign publics and military audiences for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy 
objective” (2015, p. 2).  
 
The U.S. military uses the broad term “Inform and Influence Activities” (IIA) to categorize 
subdomains such as public affairs, civil affairs, information operations, and strategic 
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communication, which serves as an umbrella to military public diplomacy activities 
(Wallin, 2015). IIA also includes “military deception” and “cyberspace operations,” but 
this thesis will not exhaustively outline activities unrelated to public diplomacy (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2013). Public affairs must be distinguished from public 
diplomacy for the purpose of this thesis, since these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the military. Public affairs, according to traditional definitions, is aimed 
at domestic audiences, while public diplomacy seeks to influence foreign publics. 
However, the U.S. military defines public affairs as “communication activities with 
external and internal audiences” with audiences defined as “a broadly-defined group that 
contains stakeholders and/or publics relevant to military operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2015, p. GL-4-5). By this terminology, U.S. military public affairs can target both 
domestic and foreign audiences. Additionally, due to developments in communications 
technology these audience division lines are becoming blurred. A U.S. Army Europe social 
media post in English about troops in the Baltic states can be intended for citizens of the 
United States, but has the reach potential of audiences with access to the same social media 
platform.  
 
Other activities under IIA also contain elements of public diplomacy. Information 
operations, under the purview of the U.S. military, is the use of information-related 
capabilities to “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and 
potential adversaries while protecting our own” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. v). 
Civil affairs (CA) or civil military operations (CMO) “encompass the activities of a 
commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and 
institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the 
reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation” (ibid, p. III-21). 
Strategic communication is “focused United States Government efforts to understand and 
engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 
advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the 
use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the 
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actions of all instruments of national power” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 2-4). 
These four domains – public affairs, information operations, civil affairs, and strategic 
communication – under IIA reveal the overlap with the definition of military public 
diplomacy: “military communication and relationship building with foreign publics and 
military audiences for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy objective.” These terms 
and activities defined according to the military are important in analyzing the interviews 
with government officials and key documents related to the U.S. military in Poland.  
 
In practice, U.S. military public diplomacy is carried out through notable activities, 
including but not limited to: humanitarian aid, international staff training, and territorial 
support (Karadag, 2017). Humanitarian assistance programs are primarily related to 
disaster relief. A recent example of humanitarian assistance is the deployment of U.S. 
troops stationed in Japan to aid in tsunami disaster relief, resulting in positive media 
coverage and increased favorable public opinion of the United States (Karadag, 2017, p. 
78). Military staff training programs and international exchanges, known in the U.S. as the 
“International Military Education and Training Program” or IMET, are also significant and 
include activities like officer exchanges between military academies in respective 
countries. Territorial support equals infrastructure support through activities like 
construction projects, such as the U.S. army engineering corps building roads near the 
Tapa military base in Estonia. A key military public diplomacy activity, military exercises, 
can appear to be a paradox. They emphasize the hard power side of a military and its 
readiness to defend or respond to conflict while also highlighting softer elements like 
intercultural friendship and cooperation, and building interoperability. U.S. military 
exercises, either under the NATO umbrella or of a joint nature with allies and partners, 
highlight these exact dimensions and prove to be opportunities to communicate with 
foreign audiences about U.S. troop presence and activities rather than just the tactical 
element of practicing for combat. Realistically, these exercises do not represent a force 
large enough to defend from full-fledged attacks but instead send signals and can either 
build or weaken credibility. The reach of joint exercises has the potential to send a set of 
messages to different target audiences in the host country, home country, other 
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allied/partner countries, and adversaries, as well as to external actors that observe certain 
activities and make assumptions about other actors.  
 
As military public diplomacy involves the coordination of a message, discussing 
propaganda is an important note as critics of public diplomacy and other communication 
methods tend to call efforts government propaganda. Because the military engages in a 
diverse range of IIA, the controversy arises when military activities like psychological 
operations (psyops) – analyzing enemy behavior and planning communication efforts to 
influence an adversary’s emotions and behavior – are conflated with military public 
diplomacy activities. Since IIA as a category is a broad umbrella that includes more covert 
actions like “military deception,” making the distinction between different areas of 
operations leads to some generalizations that all IIA are propaganda. While propaganda 
and public diplomacy’s historical roots and original purposes are hardly indistinguishable, 
contemporary public diplomacy cannot be confused with propaganda. David Welch (2013, 
p. 24) defines propaganda as a deliberate effort to influence audience opinions through 
communication ideas and values for a specific purpose, “consciously designed to serve the 
interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.” While 
this definition does appear similar to that of public diplomacy, propaganda differs from 
other forms of persuasion because it is simplistic, didactic, and aims at persuasion, not 
truth (Baines & O’Shaughnessy, 2014, p. 2).  
 
Propaganda comes in subtle and explicit forms and can be a force for both good and bad. It 
does retain, however, a negative historical connotation associated with Goebbels’ infamous 
Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Nazi Germany, to name an 
example. Propaganda is also heavily dependent on perception based on a unilateral stream 
of communication. PD, in contrast, relies more on engagement rather than a one-way flow 
of information and, in the case of U.S.-Polish relations, is perceived more often in a 
positive light. Distinguishing propaganda versus public diplomacy is relevant to this case 
(asis revealed in the interviews), since an element of U.S. military public diplomacy is 
targeting the spread of Russian disinformation and fake news – operations that aim at 
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persuasion not truth and do not emphasize relationship-building. All communication 
methods contribute to the perception of an actor and managing perception proves crucial to 
achieving foreign policy goals. Although disinformation, or the deliberate spreading of 
false information, is not necessarily the same as propaganda, it is relevant in this case 
because of Russia’s efforts to falsify stories of military presence on its western borders.  In 
Poland, Russian disinformation and propaganda efforts can severely jeopardize the United 
States’ image, creating a need for public diplomacy to be strategically positioned to 
counter false narratives.  
 
The U.S. military utilizes public diplomacy as an instrument to maintain the perception of 
U.S. credibility as a way to counter narratives linked to Russian disinformation and fake 
news. There is also a relevant historical context as a source of perceptions: how does prior 
U.S. behavior in assuring and deterring affect current Polish perceptions? The United 
States has a great stake in how Polish media perceives its message: if its credibility is 
weakened through false information, recovering the confidence of allies will prove more 
challenging and its Russia deterrence strategy will be less cohesive. Additionally, the 
assimilation of information into a set of preexisting beliefs in Poland requires the 
maintenance and constant development of the U.S. military’s message to adapt to changing 
contexts (Jervis, 1982). Media plays a key role in the pick-up of this message, in 
combination with other actors, such as civil society and government. 
1.6. (Re)Assurance and Deterrence 
In addition to the U.S. public diplomacy activities discussed, the U.S. military assigns 
specific messaging strategies depending on the audience. The first research question this 
thesis attempts to answer relates to the U.S. military’s primary message communicated to 
Poland. The following section will introduce the concepts of reassurance, assurance, and 
deterrence, and discuss how these apply to the military public diplomacy activities. 
Effective messaging in all cases requires strategic planning to ensure that there is a 
consistency between how the message is communicated and how it is perceived. A 
mismatch can occur because of various factors – cultural misunderstandings, language 
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barriers, and human error – and requires that strategies to communicate are developed in a 
way that predicts any potential misperception of a message and attempts to mitigate it in 
advance. According to current official statements, the U.S. military’s increased presence in 
Poland and other eastern flank NATO allies is intended to reassure its allies and deter its 
adversaries. Evidence of this narrative can be found in government documents and 
rhetoric, notably in U.S. President Obama’s announcement of the European Reassurance 
Initiative – later to be known as the European Deterrence Initiative – in 2014. These two 
strong narratives that the United States seeks to convey require an academic evaluation of 
the concepts of reassurance, assurance, and deterrence. Forms of assurance/reassurance 
and deterrence should be seen as a package: one does not exist without the other.   
 
Deterrence as a concept has received more attention in academic literature, with 
assurance’s importance in empirical research emerging at the end of the Cold War. 
Deterrence “seeks to prevent an undesired action by convincing the party who may be 
contemplating such action that its cost will exceed any possible gain” (Stein, 1991, p. 432). 
Amir Lupovici builds upon three waves of deterrence theory by arguing that deterrence is a 
social construction and that “discourse is an important aspect of understanding this 
strategy” (2010, p. 706). Although deterrence originally fit in the realist school of thought, 
Lupovici argues that the “fourth wave” of deterrence belongs in an intersubjective context 
and is characterized by four themes recognizing that: 
 “(i) deterrence can be learned, (ii) socialization processes affect the practices of  
deterrence, (iii) deterrence is affected by social constructions, and (iv) deterrence 
can be  studied as a discourse that consists of speech acts” (2010, p. 712) 
In the context of relationships with adversaries – and allies – deterrence strategies are 
dependent on rules, such as military doctrines, that are founded on learning and 
socialization of certain practices, knowledge, and ideas. Discourse and interactions 
construct the reality in which actors can communicate and understand such reality 
(Lupovici, 2010). Deterrence in this constructivist sense can explain how the United States 
balances the narrative of communicating security to its NATO allies while simultaneously 
not conveying escalatory rhetoric directed at Russia. Perception and misperception are 
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related to deterrence, as how Russia perceives or misperceives the U.S. intentions can 
either make the deterrence message more or less effective, respectively.  
 
If an actor identifies an adversary to deter, the chances are that actor also has allies to 
assure – or convince – of its intentions. As a concept, assurance is underdeveloped and is 
found primarily in deterrence literature. There also exists discrepancy in vernacular use of 
assurance and in academia. Ted Knopf attempts to create a generic definition of assurance: 
“a strategy that seeks to influence another actor’s behavior by alleviating the perceived 
source of insecurity and/or giving the actor a greater sense of security” (2012, p. 378) The 
four variants Knopf (2012, p. 376) describes assurance as a: “component of deterrence, 
measure directed at allies, strategy directed at potential adversaries, and tool for preventing 
nuclear proliferation.” Knopf clarifies the measure directed at allies as “alliance 
commitment” and further outlines the points of confusion surrounding academic and policy 
usage of assurance versus reassurance. Assurance in its earliest usage referred to aspects of 
deterrence of adversaries as opposed to security alliances. During the Cold War, the United 
States attempted to deter the Soviet Union from acting aggressively, but also to “satisfy the 
allies about the reliability and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence” that became known 
as “reassurance” (Yost, 2009, p. 755).  
 
Reassurance proves the most problematic term and is defined in academic literature as “a 
strategy of demonstrating non-aggressive intentions to an adversary as a way of 
compensating for the potential of deterrence and reducing the changes of unintended 
conflict” (Lebow, 1983). Knopf separates reassurance and deterrence as alternative 
strategies to the other (2012). This is puzzling, as reassurance in its contemporary usage by 
the U.S. government is directed at NATO allies, while in academic definitions, it targets 
adversaries. Military and State Department public diplomacy are used as tools of what they 
identify as reassurance in this thesis case, yet public diplomacy targeted at allied countries 
can also be a measure of deterrence, both implicitly and explicitly. It is not, however, a 
“component of deterrence”  or “deterrence-related assurance.” This type of assurance is 
used in strategies directly addressing an adversary, not an ally. The “alliance commitment” 
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type of assurance, or “alliance-related assurance” is also not all-encompassing, as the U.S. 
military seeks to satisfy allies and deter simultaneously with many of the same messages 
and its narratives are not stand-alone concepts (Knopf, 2012, pp. 380-381).  
 
Emerging in Bush-era policies – the Quadrennial Defense Review in particular – the U.S. 
defense strategy included plans to: “assure allies of the U.S. commitment to them, dissuade 
other actors from acquiring threatening new military capabilities, to deter aggression, and 
to decisively defeat those who engage the United States in hostilities.” This strategy 
distinguished “assure” as a term referring to allies, as opposed to a concept of deterrence, 
which is outlined in the strategy to “dissuade” and “deter.” However, references to 
assurance are almost always linked to strategies of deterrence: “the ability to assure was 
defined as function of the perceived ability to deter” (Yost, 2009, p. 756). This linkage is 
logical: without the presence of a potential adversary to deter, there is no present need for 
assurance strategies. The interconnectedness between the two concepts in academia and the 
two narratives in U.S. policy allow this thesis to assume that Lupovici’s constructivist 
interpretation of deterrence is applicable to assurance as well. The shift in how assurance 
and deterrence are discussed in national policy allows this case to provide insight into 
messages that are not directly related to Cold-War thinking and techniques. For the 
purpose of this thesis, assurance and reassurance will be used as strategies directed at 
Poland and deterrence as a strategy directed at Russia, aligning with current official U.S. 
government use.  
 
While the contemporary Euro-Atlantic security landscape is drastically different from that 
of the Cold War period, the two actors – NATO and Russia – are still involved in the 
adversarial geopolitical situation. The echoes of the Cold War can provide lessons for the 
modern case of assurance and deterrence in U.S. strategy in Poland: mutually assured 
destruction and the space race are clearly not as relevant, yet assumptions about how to 
convince Europeans and Russians of credibility are certainly still salient. The hidden layers 
of the two narratives of reassurance and deterrence will be explored, as assurance strategies 
can have underlying deterrence messaging, and deterrence strategies also imply assurance. 
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The way that the Polish public, in particular, perceives the message originating from 
Washington represented in U.S. military public diplomacy can reveal if the message is 
effective.  
 
For consistency, this thesis will adopt “reassurance” as the term to use in the case of the 
U.S. military in Poland, as it is the term used in the most relevant official statements and 
documents on the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve. The 
question – one this thesis seeks to explore – arises of whether Poland is convinced of the 
United States’ reassurance and deterrence narratives. “Alliance-related assurance is in the 
eye of the beholder” and if Poland believes that having troops deployed on its soil is a way 
of guaranteeing U.S. alliance security, the perceptions of reassurance will be represented 
(Hopf, 2012, p. 383). Public diplomacy to a foreign audience involves the construction of a 
message in a domestic setting, such as U.S. military planning, and the construction of 
perception in the foreign audience. Public diplomacy thus faces a problem in ensuring that 
what is intended to be communicated is interpreted in the intended way (Rasmussen, 
2009). Understanding the effectiveness of the public diplomacy message requires 
determining how the message is presented and structured in the foreign audience. 
Perception management as a strategy is a recognition of this need to create persuasive 
communication to target foreign audiences. Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald, and Shoesmith 
define perception management as “conveying or denying selected information to foreign 
governments, intelligence systems, leaders, or audiences in order to influence their 
emotions, motives, and objective reasoning” (2009, p. 127). While this definition can 
sound more like manipulative and thus more applicable to strategies directed at actors the 
U.S. considers more adversarial, it is an important concept for understanding how the 
military approaches Polish audiences. While not attempting to achieve a goal that 
negatively impacts Poland, the U.S. military does use perception management to convey a 
convincing message, one that ultimately relates to U.S. national security.  
 
Though the U.S. military can narrow its message and control for competing messages to a 
certain extent, perceptions in receiving media are multi-faceted: this leads to the 
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complicated uncovering the layers of how a message is perceived. In this specific thesis 
case, U.S. military public diplomacy events take place in small towns and are reported 
differently in local media than in national media. Local, regional, and national media each 
have their own subcategories that provide context for how the public diplomacy message is 
perceived. For example, for a single U.S. military public diplomacy event, a local 
newspaper could report on the economic value of hosting U.S. troops, a regional news 
outlet might perceive U.S. presence as a boost to regional tourism, and a national paper 
may focus on the hard security value of NATO troops and equipment on Polish soil. 
Additionally, perceptions are “focused, filtered, and fantasized by a host of mediators, the 
press, entertainment programming on television, movies, popular magazines, songs…” 
(Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald, & Shoesmith, 2009, p. 130). This means that perceptions of 
U.S. military in Poland are influenced by an array of contexts and the discourses manifest 
into the particular rhetoric that is used to portray U.S. presence in Poland and shape the 
perceptions of readers. These discourses found in Polish media are analyzed using the 
qualitative methods of discourse analysis and content analysis.  
 
The overall case of the U.S. military’s public diplomacy in Poland requires thinking about 
the message and its reception in media as a process with multiple phases. Audience 
persuasion occurs at two stages and with two actors: the U.S. military carrying out public 
diplomacy (input) and the Polish media conveying it to audiences (output). The input – or 
message of reassurance and deterrence – and the perceptions it creates are explored 
through the methodology. 
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CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter presented a theoretical and conceptual foundation for the study of 
U.S. military public diplomacy in Poland. The methodology will build  upon constructivist 
assertions of fluctuating and intersubjective meanings that contribute to state images and 
perceptions. As the research questions require extracting meaning from certain data, 
relevant methods were selected to best meet this case’s needs. The methodological 
framework for this thesis is based on an empirical research design encompassing three 
methods: interviewing, qualitative content analysis, and qualitative discourse analysis. The 
following section covers the methodological framework, including research questions, 
empirical data, and research design. Limitations of the methodological framework are also 
discussed.  
2.1. Research Questions 
Military and public diplomacy seem like a contradiction: one deals with hard power and 
security strategies, while the other emphasizes engagement with foreign publics to 
strengthen a nation’s foreign policy. Linking hard and soft power in a compatible, not 
separate way proves complicated. This case study reveals that this contradiction is not 
present in practice and that military public diplomacy is a valid concept that deserves more 
academic attention. The thesis attempts to connect the puzzling concepts into a working 
concept that can contribute to understanding how an agent other than a department tasked 
with foreign affairs can conduct public diplomacy on behalf of a country. This thesis also 
has practical implications that address the effectiveness of the United States military PD 
activities. Instead of analyzing the military’s public diplomacy strategy and its reception 
separately, this research design links message input and media output by thoroughly 
analyzing both to answer the larger question “is the U.S. military’s public diplomacy 
effective in Poland?” For the United States, a better understanding of the connection 
between the military and public diplomacy, and its ability to influence perceptions will 
contribute to smarter policies. In order to solve this puzzle, the following research 
questions are introduced to frame the methodological approach. 
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1. What is the primary message U.S. military public diplomacy is communicating to 
Poland?   
 
This “message” is not necessarily identified as speech or other written texts, but also 
through action and practice. Message in this case, broadly speaking, is a narrative 
communicated to an audience. The subcomponents of this question evaluated with 
interview data include not only the big picture of the core message, but also the sub-
elements that go into the implementation in a certain audience setting. Military public 
diplomacy is defined in the theoretical framework, using both academic foundations and 
U.S. official definitions to develop the concept. In this research question, Poland includes 
the general public, government, and military as the audience under study and does not 
make distinctions between these segments. Further research into messaging can reveal 
differentiation, however, the study’s length of time and the inability to access and research 
classified and sensitive information limit the author’s ability to delineate. To analyze the 
message of U.S. military public diplomacy, data from interviews with U.S. officials and 
experts as well as official documents are examined and used to explain the message.  
 
2. How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media? 
 
“Polish media” in this thesis references the reception and perception of U.S. military PD in 
Polish news outlets. This is answered through a two-step analysis to extract certain 
meaning from content and discourse. For the scope of this thesis, the question does not 
attempt to answer how media outlets frame or position this debate within national 
discourse. While further media studies could reveal trends such as how sources on the 
political spectrum frame PD events, this thesis only examines whether the Polish media is 
receiving the intended message from the U.S. military and how it is represented in articles. 
A selection of news articles from Polish media is analyzed using content and discourse 
analysis methods. 
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2.2. Empirical Data 
To answer the research questions guiding this thesis, the most relevant empirical data was 
identified and gathered. These sources of data include interviews with U.S. government 
officials, official U.S. documents, and Polish news articles. The time frame to gather the 
empirical evidence is from April 2014 to June 2017. Spring 2014 marks Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and the beginning of a concerted strategy of messaging reassurance 
and deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Saber Strike 2017, a U.S.-led military exercise, 
took place in June 2017 in Poland and is an appropriate cut off point considering the scope 
of this thesis. During this time, the United States elected a new president with campaign 
rhetoric that contradicted certain U.S. policies related to military presence in the region. 
However, U.S. President Trump’s administration has not shifted U.S. military posture in 
Poland significantly and will not be the central focus of this thesis, as the obvious 
difficulties in studying his rhetoric and actions in real time will only add confusion to the 
thesis rather than clarity. 
 
Interviews 
To answer the first research question – what is the primary message U.S. military public 
diplomacy is communicating to Poland? – interviews are used as the primary empirical 
data.  Four interviewees participated in the research: two from the Department of Defense 
and two from the Department of State. As the two departments have differing structures 
and assignments, both can offer diverse but official viewpoints. Participants were 
contacted and selected for their experience with the U.S. military public diplomacy, 
especially in Poland. The State Department employees are directly affiliated with political-
military affairs in NATO allied countries, including Poland, and the Department of 
Defense officials had taken part in U.S. military outreach and PD campaigns. While it may 
appear odd to select State Department officials to offer perspective on U.S. military public 
diplomacy, these officials are formally trained in public diplomacy and specifically 
military affairs. Their jobs are to understand and complement DoD efforts in order to avoid 
committing “information fratricide” or the unintended mismatch of messages originating 
from different agencies in the same government.  
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Interviews involve prior preparation and participants, representatives of the U.S. 
government, mostly stuck to official talking points, however, interviews are more 
spontaneous than scripted speeches and press releases. The interviews conducted for this 
research are anonymized, giving participants more freedom and candor to speak off the 
record about the U.S. military’s message. For a more thorough and holistic analysis, 
additional participants could have been interviewed, yet time and resources limited the 
author’s ability to conduct more interviews. All of the interviewees are from the United 
States and speak English natively, meaning that words hold the same meaning across all 
participants. Each participant represents government institutions, making the reliability of 
his or her responses dependent on what is considered appropriate to share publicly by the 
government. As the purpose of the interviews was the discover the U.S. military’s message 
in Poland, government interviews are appropriate as they align with the official policy.  
 
Official Documents and Publications 
To supplement interview data, official documents and publications were examined to give 
more context for certain points brought up during interviews, as well as to identify if any 
discrepancy existed between official policy talking points and what the interviewees said. 
This data is available open source from government websites, including the Department of 
Defense and its subsites, such as U.S. Army Europe, the Department of State, and the 
White House. These documents are not used in the methodologies used to analyze Polish 
media, but rather are examined to support the interview data. U.S. Department of Defense 
releases are especially helpful, as these can show the development of the references to 
public diplomacy and the way the term is treated in official documents. All of the material 
is open source and available to the public, which implies that this thesis will miss certain 
relevant and important information due to the sensitive nature of certain policies and 
strategies related to U.S. national security.  
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Articles 
The news articles taken for analysis include selections from across the political spectrum 
and from several outlets. As public favorability of the United States and NATO in Poland 
is high, Polish media is typically positively inclined toward U.S. presence in Poland. The 
Polish media landscape is, however, highly partisan on a political field dominated by two 
opposing parties: the current ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or PiS) 
and the former ruling party the Civil Platform (Platforma Obwyatelska or PO) 
(Dzieciolowski, 2017). In 2017, Poland ranked 54th in Press Freedom, down from 47th in 
2016 and 18th in 2015. (Press Freedom Index, 2017). Although the media landscape has 
faced political interference and partisanship, U.S. military presence and NATO 
membership are standard non-partisan issues, barring some exceptions. The high levels of 
partisanship and close media-government relations in Poland are important to keep in mind 
when analyzing how outlets in Polish media receives a message, however, they will not be 
the main focus of this thesis as it does not seek to understand whether the message is 
received differently based on political leanings of various outlets. This thesis curated 
articles from seven newspaper outlets and their respective websites as a sample of Polish 
media: Do Rzeczy, Newsweek, Polityka, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
and Rzeczpospolita. This selection represents three weeklies and four dailies, respectively, 
across the political spectrum and includes more serious publications, such as Gazeta 
Wyborcza, as well as tabloid-style outlets, like Fakt. The aim of selecting a variety of 
outlets is to obtain a representative sample of the Polish media landscape. It is not intended 
to be all-inclusive of the diversity of media in Poland as such a task would require 
significant time and resources, but to capture a snapshot of how Polish news outlets 
perceive U.S. military public diplomacy.  
 
To examine responses to direct events of U.S. military public diplomacy, certain cases 
were selected across the time frame. They are meant to be representative and do not 
encompass of all U.S. military public diplomacy activity, as such a task would require 
more resources to reach the appropriate personnel and curate relevant media. These cases 
are the arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 2014, Operation Dragoon Ride 2015 and 
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2016, the arrival of EFP troops in January 2017, and Saber Strike 2015 to 2017. These 
cases were selected to focus on media coverage of high-profile events that also receive 
international media attention. Smaller events, such as U.S. soldier community outreach 
events, would be covered more thoroughly in regional papers while these events from 2014 
to 2017 were more often reported on at the national level. These events are discussed in 
more detail in the empirical background section.  
 
To find relevant articles related to the aforementioned events, several terms and their 
Polish variations (due to case and conjugation changes) were used. A total of 103 articles 
were initially located using the search queries for the five news sites. This number was 
reduced to 76 during the precoding process to remove articles that were duplicates or near 
identical, as well as pieces that only included a small fragment discussing the U.S. military 
in the context of a different topic. To search for articles related to Dragoon Ride, the 
following search keywords included: “dragoon ride,” “rajd dragonów,” “marsz drogowy” 
(road march), and “marsz dragonów.” To find additional articles related to Dragoon Ride, 
search results for “konwój amerykańskich żołnierzy” (American soldier convoy) were 
combed. As NATO and other military exercises are typically referred to in the original 
language (English), “Saber Strike” was the primary term used. For articles related to the 
2014 Airborne Brigade arriving in Poland, keywords included: “173 grupa bojowej” 
(173rd combat group),“173 Brygada Powietrznodesantowa” (173rd Airborne Brigade), and 
“podniebni żołnierze” (sky soldiers). By searching “brygada pancerna” (armored brigade), 
articles covering the arrival of EFP U.S. troops appeared, as well as articles related to the 
other events used to select cases. Finally, to ensure thoroughness, “Europejska Inicjatywa 
Wzmocnienia”/“European Reassurance Initiative,” “Atlantic Resolve,” and “Amerykańscy 
żołnierze” (American soldiers) were used to search for additional articles that may not 
have appeared in the event-specific keyword searches. A challenge with certain keywords 
proved to be the variation in how certain events or phrases are translated into Polish, if 
translated at all. For example, Operation Dragoon Ride can appear as “Dragoon Ride,” 
“rajd dragonów,” or a Polish variation that describes a road march: “marsz drogowy.” 
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Additionally, Polish has various case endings and verb aspects that can result in missing 
relevant articles.  
 
Table 1. Sampled Articles from Polish News Outlets (Online Versions) 
News Source Website Article 
Hits 
Type 
Do Rzeczy dorzeczy.pl 10 Weekly 
Dziennik Gazeta Prawna gazetaprawna.pl 12 Daily 
Fakt fakt.pl 13 Daily 
Gazeta Wyborcza gazeta.pl 13 Daily 
Newsweek newsweek.pl 7 Weekly 
Polityka polityka.pl 5 Weekly 
Rzeczpospolita rp.pl 16 Daily 
 
2.3. Methodological Approach 
The first state of the methodological process involved analyzing the interview data to 
answer the first research question. The second research question required a two-block 
analysis entailing content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, which are elaborated 
and operationalized below. These methodologies support theoretical framework of this 
thesis that adopts elements of constructivism.  
2.3.1. Content Analysis 
Content analysis (CA) involves making inferences from text and speech using a specific 
set of procedures (Hermann, 2008) or “a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
(Krippendorff, 2013, p. 24). Content analysis as a concept dates back to the first attempts 
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at analyzing communications, however, the content analysis formalized as methodology 
only occurred within the past seven decades. 
 
This thesis utilizes content analysis as a methodology because the research question 
requires extracting meaning from communications: the Polish media’s perception of the 
U.S. military’s public diplomacy message. The research question meets Klaus 
Krippendorff’s (2013, p. 38) requirements for content analysis: it is believed to be 
answerable using text analysis, it allows for a set of possible answers, it references 
currently unobtainable phenomena, and it allows for validation. The materials used are 
representational of the thesis subject, intended to communicate meaning, and are replicable 
due to the coding procedures used (see Appendix I). The content analysis in this thesis is 
qualitative in nature, as the research question aims to evaluate perception rather than 
something that lends itself to be quantified, such as whether there is more or less of certain 
language in media. As perception implies the presence or absence of particular themes, the 
analysis is more qualitative (Hermann, 2008, p. 155). Its qualitative nature also lends itself 
to the constructivist theoretical framework that shapes this thesis: deciphering meaning 
from text in given contexts means understanding the constructed context and how the 
perceptions are informed by such context.  
 
Context is an integral part of content analysis, and “context is always constructed by 
someone” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 31). In CA, context encompasses all of the author’s 
knowledge and relates the texts to the specific research question. The texts taken from 
Polish media were not published to be analyzed by someone studying U.S. military public 
diplomacy, and these texts may carry a variety of different meanings for different analysts. 
This means that the very act of the author framing a research question and obtaining text 
for CA is placing the analysis in a specific context. CA in this thesis is deductive, which 
starts with something to look for: perception. This means that the analysis itself is not fully 
objective, however, the content used in analysis does not react to the researcher so the data 
itself is examined objectively.  
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Operationalization 
Coding – or the process of classifying to create categories – the articles requires several 
cycles of recoding and recategorizing. A code assigns meaning from data to larger portions 
of text; it summarizes the essence of meaning. Coding makes the subjective meaning more 
explicit and transparent by assigning such meaning through words. The process of coding 
(and recoding) involves labeling sections of text, which lead to categories of codes that 
develop into conceptual themes (Saldana, 2009). A code, however, is different than a 
theme: codes are labels, categories are families of codes, and themes are families of 
categories or an outcome of the process of coding. The unit of analysis for this content 
analysis will be articles, as the selection is too large for smaller units, such as sentences, 
words, or paragraphs to be used.  
 
The coding procedure was conducted in two cycles: the first cycle involved an initial 
coding the articles and the second required recoding each article based on an evaluation of 
the first cycle (Saldana, 2009). The purpose of coding multiple times is to check the 
coders’ own  subjectivity as well as account for missed codes that could have better 
answered the research question presented. Coding utilized deduction, meaning that the 
analysis started with a set of predefined themes, keywords, and concepts to identify within 
the sources. The second cycle took insight gained from thorough readings of each article 
and the first coding cycle to develop more sophisticated codes to answer research question 
one. Three dimensions can categorize the six codes used in the second and final coding 
cycle: article position, message perception, and threat perception. The first two codes 
evaluated the article’s position: the topic of discussion and attitude. Code one classified 
articles depending on the public diplomacy event discussed.  These included the 2014 
arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (A), 2015 and 2016 Operation Dragoon Ride (B), 
2015-2016 Saber Strike exercises (C), and the arrival of Enhanced Forward Presence 
Troops (D), as well as a combination of those events (E). The second code analyzed the 
articles according to the attitude toward U.S. military activity or presence: in favor (A), 
positive (B), neutral (C), negative (D), and against (E). Rather than coding for the article 
tone as a whole, the code applied to how the U.S. military was discussed. Code three to 
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five coded for the U.S. military’s message to Poland: what is the main message received 
from the U.S. military’s activities, what is the value of U.S. military activity or presence, 
and were the number of U.S. troops or type of military equipment deployed to Poland? The 
message code was broken into six subcodes: U.S. reassurance (A), deterring Russia (B), 
NATO reassurance (C), U.S. reassurance and deterrence (D), NATO reassurance and 
deterrence (E), and other or none (F). These distinctions were made to code the article 
according to the message that appeared prominently within the article. If the article 
consistently used the United States without mentioning NATO, the code was either A or D, 
whereas if NATO appeared more consistently as the actor, C and E were applied. Some 
articles did not mention aspects of deterrence like protecting NATO’s east or preventing 
Russian aggression, which explains the divisions between only reassurance and the 
combination message of reassurance and deterrence.  The fifth code identified if the article 
discussed (A) the number of U.S. troops present, (B) the type of U.S. military equipment 
present, (C) both, or (D) not present. The final code (6) analyzed the article’s threat 
discussion: was Russia mentioned, either explicitly or implicitly, as a threat to Poland? 
These codes, definitions, and relevant examples are included in a codebook in the appendix 
and accompany the final coding index of the 76 articles.  
2.3.2. Qualitative Discourse Analysis 
The selection of articles used in the content analysis was reduced to seven from 76 for a 
qualitative discourse analysis (QDA) to further develop answers to research question one. 
A range of articles were chosen to represent four key U.S. military public diplomacy 
events and the seven various news outlets. The articles were randomly sampled using 
criteria from the first code to create four separate sample pools. The final articles represent 
the proportion of media coverage of the four public diplomacy activities: three on the 
arrival of EFP troops, two reporting on Dragoon ride, one on Saber Strike, and one on the 
arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Because weeklies typically publish fewer articles 
than daily newspapers, two weekly news articles are represented in the QDA compared to 
five daily articles.  
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Meanings that are socially produced are called representations, which are reproduced 
through language and become institutionalized and normalized over time (Neumann, 2008, 
p. 61). Discourses, or representations, are these “systems of meaning-production that fix 
meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act 
within it” (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 4).  QDA has a web of theoretical influences and is 
present as a research methodology especially in fields such as linguistic studies (Gee, 
1990). The language of discourse is not only about communication techniques or 
description, but a “social practice” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 4). Based on this assumption 
of discourse, we can assume that discourses as social practices constitute a socially-
constructed world. Discourse analysis is qualitative in nature, which is why henceforth it 
will be referred to qualitative discourse analysis (QDA). 
 
QDA involves a three-step process: delimiting the identified discourses to a manageable 
range, identifying the representations within the discourse, and uncovering layering within 
the discourses (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 8). QDA is suited for “how” research 
questions, and thus is an appropriate method to answer research question two: How is U.S. 
military public diplomacy received in Polish media? After conducting a content analysis 
on article selections from Polish media, the research QDA applied to a smaller selection of 
articles. The discourses in this specific case are the articles from various Polish newspapers 
and online portals, representing a spectrum of Polish media. The particular QDA approach 
applied to a selection of Polish articles is based on Fairclough’s methodology of media 
analysis to determine how media output is perceived. Media analysis attempts to answer 
three questions about the article:  
1) How does the article represent the world (i.e. certain events)? 
2) What identities are set up for the actors in the story?  
3) What relationships are established between those involved in the story?  
In summary, the QDA determined how the article construct representations, identities, and 
relationships. These will show how the U.S. military is imagined in Polish media, 
indicating whether its message is effectively conveyed.  
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2.4. Research Design Limitations 
In terms of validity and reliability of interviewing as a form of qualitative data, the 
interviewer’s biases must be taken into account. The interviewer’s interactions influenced 
interviewees’ responses as a participant. To ensure a high degree of validity, the 
interviewer used the research questions to structure the interview questions, meaning that 
the questions addressed the research puzzle this thesis aims to solve. To ensure reliability, 
the core questions remained the same for each interviewee so that the interviews could be 
replicated by a different researcher. The interviewees were informed in advance that their 
identities would remain anonymous, giving them an extra degree of candor that would not 
have been present if speaking on the record in their official capacities. Further research 
into U.S. military public diplomacy could include former government officials or those 
with outside expertise in the field, as non-government talking points could be discussed.  
 
All sources are either newspapers (weekly or daily) and their respective online portals. 
Television is a major source of news for most Poles with over 70% of the population 
watching the largest networks (TVN and TVN24), however, curating a selection of 
materials from these outlets was improbable given the time and resource restrictions 
(Dzieciolowski, 2017, p. 27). Content and discourse analysis on video clips and newsreel 
also adds another dimension to content and discourse analysis that would complicate the 
process. While examining regional media outlets would prove useful as certain U.S. 
military public diplomacy events take place in smaller towns outside of Warsaw and key 
cities, again the resource and time restrictions do not allow for this examination. For more 
specific and narrowed insight, a particular case in one region could provide more insight 
into how local audiences perceive U.S. military public diplomacy.  A more expanded study 
of how regional Polish media or how TV/radio perceive the U.S. military’s message would 
be possible using the same methodology used in this study. Less-than-perfect search 
functions on the newspapers and online portals also may have resulted in missing certain 
articles. For example, a news outlet like wSieci does not allow searches for key terms, 
making scanning past issues the only way to find articles and an inappropriate method for 
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gathering pieces. The unreliable nature of certain search features is a disappointing but 
unavoidable issue when curating text.  
 
In terms of content analysis, coding is an approximate measure of generalizing 
information, meaning that there is a data cost associated with losing some detail in 
analysis. Coding is also the most subjective element in CA, and involves inserting a level 
of personal involvement, as “all coding is a judgement call” that involves subjectivities and 
predispositions (Saldana, 2009, p. 7). Additionally, the most effective and precise coding 
involves multiple coders and more cycles of recoding. Under the scope of this thesis, the 
independent nature and time constraints limited the full potential of the coding process. 
Like coding, QDA is a subjective process that begins with the researcher’s own influences, 
making objectivity improbable. To combat subjectivity in both processes, multiple 
readings and background research helped approach the texts with more facts rather than 
impressions. Language added another challenge to methodology both for content analysis 
and qualitative discourse analysis: the author’s Polish level is B2, which means that some 
search terms may have led to overlooking certain articles as well as misinterpreting during 
the coding and QDA process. The author consulted with native Polish speakers to verify 
certain information in Polish and supplemented translations with additional resources. In 
the future, running a Polish-language version without English translation for content 
analysis could prove more insightful, as naturally some meaning is lost when translated 
into a second language. 
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CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The following sections introduce an empirical background to give both the theoretical 
discussions and methodological approaches more real-world context. Public diplomacy’s 
history will be discussed, as its historical context that played a role in shaping the methods 
and messages of current U.S. (military) public diplomacy. The contemporary security 
environment will be given a brief overview, as the situation in Ukraine and U.S.-Russia or 
NATO-Russia relations are not the primary focal points but the Euro-Atlantic landscape is 
the setting for this case. U.S.-Polish relations are also important to discuss, given that most 
public diplomacy research focuses on more adversarial relationships, rather than a strong 
allied relationship with deep historical ties. Additionally, key U.S. military events that are 
used to define the collection of empirical data are described. The purpose of these 
backgrounds is to provide context for the methods that analyze related interviews and 
texts. 
3.1. Propaganda, Cultural Offensives, and Public Diplomacy 
U.S. public diplomacy’s history is important in evaluating the case study of the U.S. 
military and Poland, as historical cycles reveal that the attention given to public diplomacy 
reflects perceptions of external threats. Recognized in the World Wars, public diplomacy, 
albeit in other words, became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. In the early to mid-20th 
century, however, distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy was neither 
necessary nor clear. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson began normalizing the phrase “public 
diplomacy” in reference to his Fourteen Points, and in the post-World War era, its usage 
became associated with international information and propaganda. New methods of 
contacting publics, such as the presence of radios in American homes and TV sets across 
the world, created a vulnerable space that required a strategy. U.S. entry into WWII saw a 
shift to a “cultural offensive” seen with the establishment of the Office of Wartime 
Information and the Office of Strategic Service. 
 
The Cold War reignited government efforts to engage in public diplomacy in addition to 
military power projection. The U.S. Information Agency – established in 1953 that became 
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part of the State Department in 1999 – identified the necessity of messaging to foreign 
publics. Because of the conflation with what we now know as propaganda, in 1965 the 
USIA recognized the official need for a term and thus enshrined the phrase into U.S. policy 
(Cull 2006). In the post-Cold War era,  until the war on terror in the early 2000s, public 
diplomacy seemed to be waning in its importance to U.S. power. The U.S. Information 
Agency, following the Cold War, became a branch of the State Department’s 
organizational structure, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs.  
 
Renewed attention to U.S. PD efforts arose after September 11, 2001, when the 
government saw a need to communicate the U.S. message to foreign publics and as the 
international community increasingly criticized U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, the 
information age has led to an explosion of information. The government now has had to 
reconcile that too much information can lead to too little attention, and re-strategize to 
effectively communicate to foreign publics. Without the ability of the government to 
control information flows, how an actor’s reputation is formed and thus its credibility is 
increasingly reliant on strategic planning of communication to foreign publics (Nye, 2004). 
Modern public diplomacy, facilitated primarily by the State Department, includes a range 
of activities including globally-branded initiatives, such as American Corners, 
ShareAmerica, and the Fulbright Program.  
 
The historical cycles of U.S. public diplomacy reflect links to conflict and external threats, 
such as in response to World War II, during the Cold War, and post-9/11 and the war on 
terrorism (Gregory, 2008). Heightened international tension equaled increased attention to 
public diplomacy and cultural promotion efforts. While this thesis focuses on U.S. 
(military) public diplomacy, it is not a set of activities or foreign policy strategy limited 
solely to the United States. Melissen argues that public diplomacy, in general, is 
reactionary. Increased public diplomacy efforts, for example, followed a drop in positive 
foreign perceptions of the U.S. after the Iraq invasion (2005, p. 7). The U.S. is not isolated 
in this reactionary characteristic of public diplomacy: Poland used PD to improve its image 
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for EU leaders as a reliable partner willing to compromise in order to gain EU accession 
(Ociepka & Ryniejska, 2005). This reactionary nature is important to note as the U.S. 
messaging to Poland and other NATO allies has gained renewed attention as a strategy to 
combat Russian disinformation. While not a direct conflict with the United States, 
international tension following the Russian annexation of Crimea reflects this reactionary 
cycle of emphasizing PD.  
 
U.S. military public diplomacy has followed a less obvious historical trajectory as did 
USIA, later State Department public diplomacy. One critical juncture has become apparent 
in the development of U.S. military PD: the post-9/11 era ushered in a new focus on the 
military acting as an agent of information and communication to foreign publics, especially 
in the Middle East. While lines between the State Department and Defense Department are 
distinct in many ways, in some cases the military is better positioned to conduct public 
diplomacy, such as in war zones and high-tension areas. The Defense Department, with 
more than three million employees, also can utilize more manpower than the State 
Department, with 74,000 employees. Contemporary examples of U.S. military public 
diplomacy include port visits in Southeast Asia and female engagement teams in Iraq 
(Wallin, 2015).  
3.2. Security Environment and U.S.-Polish Relations 
The Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 resulted in direct responses 
from the U.S. government, primarily in the form of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and 
its funding framework called the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), renamed later as 
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Poland is a key player in this security order, as it lies 
in Central Europe at the heart of NATO. Because of its antagonistic history with Russia, 
the Soviet Union, and now Russia again, Poland has a longstanding distrustful view of 
Russia. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project (2017) reveals that only 21% of Poles have a 
favorable view of Russia, compared to an even lower 12% in 2014 immediately after 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 34% in 2007. Poland reacted negatively to the invasion 
of its neighbor Ukraine, with whom it shares a complex yet overall positive relationship. 
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While frustrations over immigration from Ukraine cloud some positive perceptions of 
Ukrainians in Poland and are exacerbated by anti-immigration Law and Justice party 
narratives, the government remains staunchly anti-Russian, pro-NATO, and pro-U.S. 
presence.  
 
U.S.-Polish relations are especially strong, owing to a long history of bilateral relations. 
Defense relations with Poland deepened after Poland’s admission to NATO in 1999, 
especially with Polish participation in U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 
2014, President Obama announced the European Reassurance Initiative at a joint press 
conference in Warsaw on the 25th anniversary of Poland’s freedom from Soviet rule 
(Obama & Komorowski, 2014). His announcement included notice of increased equipment 
and troop pre-positioning, rotational army and air force personnel, and partnerships with 
non-NATO countries also subject to Russian pressure, such as Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. The $1 billion President Obama pledged in 2014 to “bolster the security of our 
NATO allies” grew to $6.5 billion for the 2019 fiscal year to increase troop presence, 
increase exercises and training, enhance prepositioning, improve infrastructure, and build 
partnership capacity (U.S. European Command Public Affairs Office, 2017). As reflected 
in official White House and Department of Defense statements, the U.S. defense posture in 
Poland and CEE is directly related to NATO. Though the relationship is without 
complications and diplomatic tussles, President Obama’s choice to announce new 
assurance and deterrence strategies in Warsaw proved both symbolic in affirming the 
bilateral and U.S.-NATO commitments. In 2017, U.S. Army Europe relocated its OAR 
division-level headquarters to Poland in another display of commitment.  
 
President Trump’s erratic campaign and his presidency marked by inconsistency between 
action and rhetoric have not markedly affected Polish perceptions of the United States. 
Poland maintains high levels of public support for the United States, with 73% viewing the 
U.S. as favorable, and only 15% as unfavorable though confidence in Trump as a president 
is low in Poland (57% in 2017) (Wilke et. al., 2017, p. 17, 24). In fact, favorability in 
Poland about the United States only dropped one point, 74% to 73%, from Obama to 
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Trump (ibid., p. 22). Support for NATO remains high with 79% viewing NATO favorably, 
and 7% viewing NATO unfavorably (Stokes, 2017, p. 6). From 2015 to 2017, Polish faith 
that the “U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO ally if it got into a serious 
military conflict with Russia” increased eight points from 49% to 57% (Wilkes, 2017, p. 
9). Overall, support for NATO among its allies is highest in Poland (tied with the 
Netherlands) and Polish favorability of the United States is the highest in Europe. These 
global attitudes numbers are presented to provide a background to the context in which 
U.S. military public diplomacy operations as one of general positive attitudes.  
 
An issue in U.S.-Polish relations for over a decade has been the question of U.S. bases on 
Polish soil (Strosin, 2012). This is also a factor that plays a role in how the U.S. military 
currently approaches deploying troops to Poland. While the Polish government – both 
parties – have pushed for hosting a military installation, the issue is controversial for a 
number of reasons. First, the U.S. has significant military installations in Germany, 
Poland’s neighbor, and establishing new bases is an investment and dramatic shift in U.S. 
defense posture in Europe. Second, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 allegedly 
rules out the permanent basing of NATO troops on Russia’s western border. Even a 
discussion of a potential base aggravates Russian concerns of U.S. influence on the 
European continent. The United States has, however, deployed temporary troops to Poland 
both before and after 2014. In 2018, Poland signed a deal to purchase the U.S.-produced 
anti-missile Patriot defense system. This places permanent military equipment on Russia’s 
borders and has already resulted in criticism from Moscow. What is important to note 
about the relationship between Poland and the United States is that Poland is not caught in 
the crosshairs of U.S.-Russian tension but rather plays an active role in shaping NATO and 
U.S. defense posture and the reaction to such policies.  
3.3. Boots on the Ground in Poland: U.S. Military Public Diplomacy Activities  
As the timeframe of this thesis spans four years (2014-2017), several examples of U.S. 
military public diplomacy in Poland were identified to help narrow the selection of 
relevant articles for content and discourse analysis. These events are the arrival of the 
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173rd Airborne Brigade (April 2014), Operation Dragoon Ride (March 2015), Operation 
Dragoon Ride II (June 2016), Saber Strike military exercise (2015-2017), and the arrival of 
U.S. troops for NATO’s EFP (January 2017). An important note is that although some 
military PD events are NATO-related, they are relevant to the thesis discussion as NATO 
is an element of the military’s messaging and the framework for United States defense 
posture in Europe.  
 
On April 24, 2014, the first contingent of U.S. troops arrived in Poland from the 173rd 
Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy. As only 150 troops landed in Poland to conduct 
the first of a series of (now) continuous exercises meant to reassure NATO allies, the event 
was symbolic rather than a tactical display of the willingness to engage in direct military 
conflict. Department of Defense spokesman John Kirby denied that it was purely symbolic: 
“Any time you put troops on the ground and doing exercises, in this case for a month at a 
time, it’s more than symbology. The kind of work that we’re going to be doing is real 
infantry training. And that’s not insignificant” (Montgomery, 2014). Although not the first 
military exercise or NATO-related activity in Eastern Europe, the deployment of the 173rd 
to Poland and the Baltic states represented a reaction to Russia’s actions. The non-
permanent deployment continues criticism from Moscow, who views U.S. presence, even 
on a rotational basis, as violating the NATO-Russia founding act of 1997.  
 
Operation Dragoon Ride I and II represent a key U.S. military public diplomacy activity. 
Dragoon Ride began in March 2015 as a way to capitalize on troop movement by 
transforming a routine convoy of U.S. military equipment and soldiers into an outreach 
event. The Ride in 2015 left Estonia and crossed Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic, finishing in Vilseck, Germany, where the U.S. has a permanent military 
installation. The reverse occurred in June 2016 when the Ride left Germany towards 
Estonia. In various locations along the route, the convoy paraded through towns and 
villages and allowed for local residents to interact with the Stryker armored vehicles and 
soldiers. The side events that took place during Dragoon Ride are called “static displays,” 
which include military equipment – usually vehicles – being on display to the public.  
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In January 2017, as part of the NATO initiative decided during the 2016 Warsaw Summit 
called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), a U.S.-led battlegroup arrived in Poland. Poland 
is the EFP host country for U.S. troops, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania hosting the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany, respectively. Although this event is affiliated 
with NATO’s EFP, this proved a key opportunity for U.S. military public diplomacy, as 
Poland is the host nation for U.S. troops specifically. Approximately 1,000 U.S. soldiers 
from the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (3/2CR) deployed to Orzysz, 
Poland, supplemented by 350 troops from contributing countries (U.S. Mission Poland, 
2017). This deployment is part of a larger posture that will rotate through Eastern Europe.  
 
Saber Strike is also a noteworthy event for U.S. military public diplomacy. Saber Strike is 
a U.S. Army Europe-led joint military exercise that began in 2010 and involves Poland and 
the three Baltic states (U.S. Army Europe, 2018). Exercise Saber Strike focused primarily 
on the Baltic states in 2014 but refocused on the three states and Poland in 2015 and 
onwards. Although a military training exercise would appear to be unrelated to public 
diplomacy, the U.S. military and NATO allies use it as demonstrations to local publics 
through intensive social media campaigns and media engagement. Saber Strike is the 
umbrella operation for the road march from Germany through Poland and the Baltic states: 
Operation Dragoon Ride. Saber Strike also emphasizes the NATO element, as well as 
building partnership capacity, as it includes troops contributions from allied countries like 
Canada and partnership countries like Finland. 
 
How Poland perceives these activities answers the question of whether the military is 
effectively conducting military public diplomacy. These four activities represent the 
United States reassurance and deterrence posture outlined in official documents, and the 
degree to which this is conveyed is analyzed in the following sections.  
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS 
The following two-part analysis aims to determine the military’s input – its message – and 
its output – reception in Polish media. The first part reveals how the military’s self-image 
and its own views of Poland as a target audience shape its message. The second answers if 
Poland receives the image of the U.S. military through this messaging as credible. In other 
words, is the perception of the U.S. military favorable in Polish news outlets? 
4.1. What is the primary message the U.S. military is communicating to Poland? 
Empirical data taken from interviews and official documents support the answer to the first 
research question. The question will be broken down into smaller sections to analyze the 
various question components: what is the message, how is the U.S. military 
communicating, and how is the U.S. military communicating to a Polish audience in 
particular? The analysis finds that “reassurance and deterrence” can describe the core 
message, but that this is composed of other messages like NATO solidarity and 
cooperation. It is conducted through events like the ones outlined, and the visual and 
tactical military capabilities plan a role in conveying the message.  
4.1.1. Reassurance and Deterrence 
The public diplomacy activities and the military’s message are two components of U.S. 
military posture in Poland: the former involves action and the message is what the action 
means. Examples of what the U.S. military does to carry out public diplomacy include 
Operation Dragoon Ride and the arrival of the EFP troops. The overall message associated 
with these activities is, according to official statements, one of reassuring allies and 
deterring adversaries. Deterrence and reassurance are interrelated: one does not occur 
without the other. In the interviews and supplementary empirical data, these two concepts 
together prove to be the primary message, although in the case of Poland more emphasis is 
placed on communicating reassurance than displaying deterrence.  
 
Operation Atlantic Resolve is the umbrella to the European Reassurance/Deterrence 
Initiative and related U.S. military activities, such as the public diplomacy events this 
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thesis examines. The official purpose of OAR “is a demonstration of continued U.S. 
commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO 
allies and partners of America's dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in 
light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine” (U.S. Army Europe, 2018). Reassurance 
directly appears, explicitly but also with the description of U.S. commitment to collective 
security. Deterrence is a less explicit message according to official statements: the focus 
instead is on a commitment to peace and stability related to Russia’s aggression rather than 
directly engaging to deter Russia from any further aggressive activity. This was further 
emphasized by the interviewees, who pointed out that “one of the smart things we’ve done 
in the last four years since Crimea is that we have not made this primarily about Russia in 
a direct way” (Interviewee 3, 2018).  
 
The consensus among interviewees is that the purpose of U.S. military public diplomacy is 
to “raise the visibility of NATO,” focusing on inter-alliance cooperation and amplifying 
that message to domestic, alliance, partner, and Russian audiences. This is evident with the 
“willingness to send millions of dollars of equipment and thousands of troops to NATO 
allies to show that we’re there for them.”  (Interviewee 4, 2018). The U.S. approach has 
strategically attempted to control the narrative by focusing on the “we are NATO” message 
in contrast to narratives attempting to draw attention to the adversary – Russia (Interviewee 
2, 2018). This strategy contributes to perception management: if NATO allies perceive the 
U.S. military as a force of peace rather than a force provoking Europe’s neighbor, publics 
and their respective governments are more inclined to view U.S. military posture 
favorably. While U.S. presence and activity in Poland and other NATO allies is framed 
domestically as a matter of national interest for the United States, communicating to 
foreign publics almost always attempts to emphasize the NATO element. “Allied 
solidarity,” as opposed to images of U.S. unilateral action, works in favor of the U.S. 
military, first by granting more credibility to have troops stationed in Europe and second 
by engaging other allies and partners to share the burden of ensuring “peace and stability. 
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In summary, the primary message the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland is one of 
reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment through amplifying NATO solidarity while 
simultaneously deterring Russia from aggression. Deterrence is not a direct response to 
Russia, but the public diplomacy activities are rather “good things for our alliance” that 
boost NATO solidarity while simultaneously enhancing the message of deterrence 
(Interviewee 2, 2018). This balance is how the military manages to engage in tactical 
operations related to the security of Europe while not escalating rhetoric that could lead to 
conflict with Russia. 
4.1.2. Toys to Show Off and Folks in Uniform 
Constructivist scholars argue that material capabilities are embedded with meaning 
through social interactions and contexts, and this is shown through the military’s soldiers 
and equipment gaining meaning through public diplomacy events. While reassurance and 
deterrence as a package is the core message of U.S. military public diplomacy, how this 
message is conveyed includes the strategic use of tactical military exercises, equipment, 
and boots on the ground. The interviewees confirmed that the military has a much 
narrower set of topics to frame its public diplomacy in contrast to the State Department in 
this case. This limits the number of themes able to be communicated, but conversely 
allows the military’s material capabilities to become tools with which to amplify the 
narrower message. These highly visible assets represent a tangible component of the 
United States military’s image.  
 
Official statements, press releases, images, and videos consistently center around the 
visuals of military exercises. For example, a video uploaded by U.S. Army Europe entitled 
“Saber Strike 2017” opens with firing a javelin, followed by a bomber flying overhead, 
soldiers in fatigues, and tanks rolling through a field. All of the interviewees, when asked 
how U.S. military public diplomacy is conducted, mentioned these types of military 
exercises and that “we’ve got a lot of toys to show off” (Interviewee 1, 2018). There exists 
an “allure of the life of a soldier” that the U.S. military captures well through its photo and 
video releases depicting “a man or woman in uniform with big, heavy, expensive 
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machinery” (Interviewee 2, 2018). The military considers “every soldier a diplomat” 
(Interviewee 4, 2018). This contrasts traditional models of public diplomacy, such as the 
methods the State Department uses to communicate American values to a narrow audience 
in a host country that include events like hosting American jazz bands or educational 
exchanges. The military instead focuses on what is “much more tactical, much more 
visible” than what is seen as softer and values based (Interviewee 2, 2018). The added 
value of military exercises and images of U.S. soldiers and equipment is the circulation 
that extends beyond a host country, especially as click-worthy images and videos that, for 
example, elicit associations with popular video games, are shared across platforms on 
social media. While other countries require more contextualization for sensitivities when 
bringing in the U.S. military, the use of tactical equipment and soldiers in uniform 
intentionally promotes the image of the military to evoke a sense of security. In Poland, 
few sensitivities about U.S. military presence are needed, giving the military flexibility to 
“show off” its capabilities.  
 
The State Department initiates specific events categorized as public diplomacy, while the 
U.S. military takes existing events and amplifies certain elements to create public 
diplomacy. As an example of U.S. military public diplomacy, the Department of Defense 
interviewees used Operation Dragoon Ride as “one of the most brilliant things we came up 
with as a public affairs, public diplomacy, strategic communication initiative” (Interviewee 
1, 2018). Dragoon Ride involved static displays of military equipment and soldiers 
interacting with locals. Images of Dragoon Ride frequently depicted images of young 
children holding an American flag as a Stryker rolls by or trying on a soldier’s helmet. 
These events “just have the coolness factor. Kids are attracted to that stuff, almost like it’s 
magnetic” (Interviewee 1, 2018). During the road march the U.S. military allowed 
journalists to participate and “we could see all the Polish citizens driving alongside the 
convoy, blowing kisses and stuff, and the journalists really could understand the 
enthusiasm that people had standing out there with American or NATO flags” (Interviewee 
3, 2018). The January 2017 arrival of U.S. troops as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward 
Presence also reflected the use of a tactical mission to amplify U.S. messages in media 
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without additional events designated solely as “public diplomacy.” A parade and opening 
ceremony in Żagan, Poland, gathered media attention as the soldiers flown into Wrocław 
arrived for the first – and symbolic – deployment of NATO troops to Poland as part of 
EFP. While Poles and other alliance members, especially the Baltic states and others 
concerned about future Russian aggression, were a key target to message, the domestic 
factor also played a role: “For a domestic audience they filmed a commercial for during the 
Superbowl about the soldiers connecting with their soldiers while watching the Superbowl. 
That really, for a lot of Americans, raised awareness that we have all these soldiers in 
Poland and put Zagan on the map” (Interviewee 3, 2018).  Significant moments that result 
from public diplomacy strategies like these generate attractiveness and influence how those 
involved and those who observe perceive the U.S. military.  
4.1.3. A Favorable Audience 
As discussed extensively when conceptualizing military public diplomacy, definitions 
within the U.S. government add another level of complexity to applying a theoretical 
evaluation to a case like the military in Poland. Two of the four interviewees, each 
representing a different department, used public affairs as the preferred term, while the 
others used public diplomacy. One used strategic communication, public affairs, and 
public diplomacy interchangeably. The two interviewees also emphasized that the military 
is also responsible for “telling Americans” the story about the family and friends serving in 
Poland, and gaining domestic support for the military. However, the interviewees 
confirmed that public affairs is not solely directed at domestic audiences, but that it 
complements State Department messaging to foreign audiences and can engage in its own 
communication to a foreign public.  
 
Because the U.S. military maintains a presence across the world, messaging to different 
audiences requires an understanding of cultural context and other complexities. The 
interviewees were quick to point out that Poland proves to be a receptive and enthusiastic 
audience: “I think Poland is one of the easiest places to execute public diplomacy for the 
U.S. military” (Interviewee 1, 2018). In contrast to Estonia and Latvia with Russian-
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speaking populations, Poland’s homogeneity allows for the U.S. military to communicate 
with limited resources but still reach most of the population with the same message 
(Interviewees 1, 2, & 3, 2018). Additionally, the strong historical and defense relationships 
between Poland and the United States play a role in how the U.S. has strategically shaped 
the narrative directed at Poland. Polish public opinion of the United States is the most 
favorable in Europe. The message must also withstand scrutiny from external countries 
within or outside of NATO. Instead of making a Polish-specific message, U.S. military 
public diplomacy amplifies certain aspects of the primary message related to Poland, such 
as social media posts showing soldiers expressing how much they enjoy pierogi and 
emphasizing in statements that the United States is impressed with Poland’s capability to 
build barracks to accommodate so many troops. Overall, the characteristics of Polish 
audiences mean that U.S. military public diplomacy has less damage control to do than in 
other countries who are less inclined to appreciate U.S. soldiers or with hostile operational 
environments if something goes awry. Even media and the public discussing the road 
accidents that involved U.S. heavy equipment and soldiers “were not people criticizing the 
presence of U.S. soldiers – the overall tone was very positive” (Interviewee 1, 2018). 
Additionally, the government proves easy to work with and anti-Americanism is an outlier 
within the domestic political system (ibid).  
 
What became clear from interviews and through U.S. government language is that U.S. 
military posture in Poland is not only related to enhancing Poland’s security, but also to 
U.S. national interests. Strong messages of reassurance and deterrence contribute to the 
overall global image of the United States. If the U.S. is able to effectively deter Russia 
through its military posture on NATO’s eastern flank, for example, other potential 
adversaries may also perceive U.S. deterrence as credible. Along those lines, how the 
media receives the message contributes to whether Poland perceives U.S. reassurance as a 
steadfast and reliable commitment. One of the lessons learned from conducting U.S. 
military public diplomacy is that the Polish media is more effective at communicating with 
the host nation than the military can with the resources available (Interviewee 2, 2018). 
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This means that the military counts on positive reception in media outlets to reinforce its 
message.  
4.2. How is U.S. military public diplomacy received in Polish media?  
Now that the empirical evidence outlined the U.S. military’s message, this section will 
analyze the results of content and qualitative discourse analyses to answer the second 
research question: How is U.S. military public diplomacy perceived in Polish media? 
Polish news outlets act as a medium to the Polish population as a whole, and although a 
variety of factors can influence perception, these outlets are still primary sources of 
accessible information. Based on the interviews, the Polish media appears to perceive U.S. 
military presence positively, and this section will provide evidence to support this claim.  
4.2.1. Results of Content Analysis 
After reducing the initial number of articles from over 103 to 76 using the keywords 
described in the methodology section, qualitative content analysis was applied to the 
remaining articles. As discussed in the methodological framework, the coding process 
involved two cycles: initial coding and recoding. An uneven distribution of articles from 
each source occurred that could be due to a range of factors. First are the limitations 
previously discussed in terms of potential language mistakes in keywords and queries. The 
second is the unreliable nature of many archival databases that initially precluded the use 
of certain news outlets and limited the ability to search. By using broader search terms and 
using different search databases, such as Google in addition to the news source’s own 
website, the effects of such limitations were mitigated to a certain extent. The articles from 
seven different Polish news outlets varied in length and style. Some websites primarily had 
authored articles on the topics used as search criteria, such as Rzeczpospolita, while others 
like Fakt published unauthored articles. While an extended study could explore how the 
news outlets and journalists use the articles to frame a media debate, this study focuses 
primarily on how the U.S. military’s message is received generally in Polish media.  
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Following the collection and sorting of the articles, the first state of CA involved an initial 
round of coding. The codes used in the first cycle, mostly descriptive, built upon the 
content and themes that emerged during the final stage of coding. The codebook defining 
the six codes used in the second cycle, as well as the coding index of all articles are 
included in the Appendix of this thesis. This section will present the coding results and 
analyze them to answer the second research question: how is the U.S. military’s message 
received in Polish media? The message that the CA attempts to identify is defined as the 
U.S. military amplifying U.S. reassurance and NATO solidarity while deterring Russia 
with credible posturing.  
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Military Public Diplomacy Activity 
 
The logical first code categorized the articles based on the main topic related to U.S. 
military public diplomacy. Because the search queries involving using keywords related to 
specific public diplomacy events, the first code proved easy to identify in the articles. An 
uneven distribution of topics emerged as a result of this code. The majority, 41, of articles 
focused on the recent arrival of the U.S. troops as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence 
NATO mission in 2017. It also proved the only event that appeared in each of the seven 
sources. Mentioned by one of the interviewees as a hugely successful U.S. military public 
diplomacy event, it succeeded in grabbing headlines not only in January 2017 but in the 
months leading up to and following the troop arrival to Orzysz. The media hype 
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surrounding the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw that announced EFP or the significance of 
the number of U.S. troops deployed – larger than other previous deployments or rotations – 
can explain the high volume of relevant articles. In contrast to the arrival of the 173rd 
paratroopers in 2014 that served as a mostly symbolic rotation following the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, the troops in Poland represent a more significant show of force 
based on number and the extended commitment of EFP.  
 
Operation Dragoon Ride, also discussed in the interviews as a highly successful public 
diplomacy event, received positive media attention: all of the articles discussed the event 
as a way of contributing to Polish security. All also focused on an element of U.S. 
reassurance, either reassurance alone or combined with a message of deterrence, showing 
that the perception of American tanks and soldiers passing through Polish towns 
represented the U.S. commitment to the Polish people. These articles also tended to 
include visuals or descriptions of community outreach, representing the people-to-people 
engagement found in public diplomacy strategies. Because the road march passed through 
regions and small towns, non-national news outlets could provide more insight, yet this 
analysis focuses on the perception at the national level.  
 
Figure 2. Attitude Toward U.S. Military Activity/Presence 
 
The attitude toward U.S. military activities and presence proved difficult to code for. As 
Polish is the author’s second language, picking up the nuances on tone and connotations on 
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certain words may have led to imprecise coding. However, multiple readings and 
translating certain phrases mitigated many of the issues. Overall the articles proved mostly 
neutral in tone, followed by smaller proportions of positive and favorable coverage. The 
fact that the articles represented neutral positions is to be expected: for pieces without 
strong partisan biases or debates, news outlets attempt to focus on presenting stories as a 
more neutral informant. Only two held negative attitudes about U.S. military presence: one 
related to soldiers abiding by Polish laws and the other about the possible negative 
economic outcomes from the U.S. deploying troops to Poland. Both of these articles were 
authored, indicating that the journalist took a position in the reporting. These were not 
against the U.S. military arriving in Poland, instead focusing on disadvantages. While 
those against the U.S. military presence could be found in more fringe news outlets or 
through other search criteria, no search query used to collect empirical data resulted in 
articles that argued against the U.S. military’s deployment to Poland. The fact that public 
opinion in Poland views the United States and NATO favorably can explain the lack of 
articles contra U.S. military presence. As the Polish government is also enthusiastic about 
the U.S. military, news outlets report on positive statements and quotes from politicians as 
well. Additionally, opinion pieces did not emerge as the primary format for the articles, 
limiting what attitude the pieces adopted.  
 
The “message” dimension was explored with three main codes: the primary message 
received (3), value for Poland (4), and the inclusion of troop numbers and type of 
equipment (5).  
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Figure 3. Primary Message Received from U.S. Military Activities/Presence 
 
The first cycle of coding combined U.S. reassurance and deterrence with NATO 
reassurance and deterrence, yet the coding process revealed that articles typically 
positioned one actor differently from the other. The reason for differentiation is based on 
the interview data on the U.S. military’s message. The U.S. military not only uses public 
diplomacy in Poland to amplify themes of what the United States is unilaterally doing for 
Poland, but also to promote the ideas of NATO solidarity and cooperation. Additionally, 
the interviews revealed messaging is designed to draw attention to NATO, not to Russia’s 
narratives. The separation of the core message into four codes is to identify which 
messages came through strongly. Some articles discussed the U.S. military presence with 
few or no mentions to NATO or Russia (U.S. reassurance), for example, while others 
focused on the cooperation among allies that would defend Poland from Russia (NATO 
reassurance and deterrence). All four of the codes reveal the U.S. military public 
diplomacy’s effectiveness in communicating reassurance and deterrence, as only 13% of 
the articles did not illustrate the message. Interestingly, no article positioned the debate as 
the U.S. military’s primary purpose to deter, showing that the U.S. military’s public 
diplomacy message conveyance is non-escalatory.  
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Figure 4. Value of U.S. Military Activities/Presence 
 
While reassurance and deterrence are the key narratives of U.S. public diplomacy, part of 
the events communicate added benefit to Poland. The fourth code aimed to determine how 
the article determined the value of U.S. military activities in Poland for the country. The 
interviewees asserted that the U.S. military aims to add value to Poland, primarily in terms 
of national security and the resulting 71% of sampled articles reveal that the presence of 
U.S. troops and their activity is perceived as benefiting Polish security. What is not present 
in official documents and statements, but was revealed in the interviews is that the U.S. 
military also uses the economic potential of U.S. presence to improve how the presence is 
perceived. This was also reported by articles, and is another dimension of a U.S. military 
public diplomacy event that can convince Polish citizens to support the presence. Even if a 
citizen does not agree with the security situation, the potential added value in economic 
terms is convincing. Several articles also placed the U.S. military public diplomacy event 
in the context of domestic politics, for example, whether or not former Prime Minister 
Beata Szydło was responsible for securing greater numbers of U.S. troops. No article 
argued that the presence would be a disadvantage to Poland through destabilizing relations 
with Russia.  
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Figure 5. Mention of Number of U.S. Troops and/or Type of Military Equipment 
 
As explored in the analysis of research question one, the tactical and visible elements of 
the U.S. military, or the “allure of the life of a soldier” and “toys to show off,” are core 
components of what the U.S. military communicates in its messaging strategy. The fifth 
code aimed to identify if articles included references to how many U.S. troops were 
deployed to Poland and the type of U.S. military equipment, in other words, is this element 
of what the interviewees believe is a part of the message received by Polish media? The 
results of the coding hint that the U.S. military is effective in making the imagery of 
soldiers and military equipment part of the message, and that the Polish public, as 
represented in media, responds to these symbols within public diplomacy. Over half 
mentioned both: some articles described in separate paragraphs the types of tanks and 
weapons brought by soldiers, while others referenced in less detail. Only 12% of the 
articles mentioned neither the number of U.S. troops nor the type of military equipment, 
although in some of the articles coded for “Not Present” the overall number of NATO (not 
U.S.) soldiers were included.  
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Figure 6. Threat Perception – Mention of Russia 
 
The final code related to how Poland’s threat perception within the articles discussing U.S. 
military public diplomacy activities. The U.S. military aims to make deterrence more of a 
secondary message, part of the larger reassurance narrative. As one interviewee pointed 
out, a great success is the military making its presence about allied solidarity not about 
provoking war with Russia. However, Russian aggression in Ukraine precipitated the U.S. 
military’s increased presence in Poland and is a dominant narrative in Poland domestically, 
as Ukraine’s immediate neighbor with its own history of Soviet aggression. The coding 
process sought to determine how Russia was perceived in the articles related to U.S. 
military public diplomacy and found that almost half did not mention Russia, while  the 
other half either mentioned Russia explicitly or in more roundabout ways, such as 
emphasizing the security of NATO’s eastern flank or the potential for aggression from the 
East. Explicit mentions named Russia or the Kremlin, but rarely proved to be the central 
focus of the article.  
 
In summary, a content analysis of the articles reveals that the U.S. military’s message 
conveyed through public diplomacy events is received in Polish media. The United States 
is perceived as reliable guarantor of security for Poland, due to the Polish media, in 
general, viewing the military favorably and its messages of both U.S. and NATO 
reassurance and deterrence as credible. The code that factored how the articles presented 
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troop numbers and military equipment reveal that the military recognizes that its image 
associated with tactical and visible elements is an instrument that can be utilized to 
positively influence that image. The next stage of qualitative discourse analysis will go 
into more depth about how the message is perceived, answering questions about the 
effectiveness of the overall message.  
4.2.2. Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis 
Seven articles from the content analysis selection were analyzed using qualitative 
discourse analysis that cover each military public diplomacy event. A close reading of the 
selected articles to “delineate the discursive elements at play” contributed to answering the 
second research question on how the media receives the U.S. military’s message (Dunn & 
Neumann, 2016, p. 103). The discourse analysis broke down the articles to understand how 
the article represents the event, what identities are set up for those involved, and what 
relationships are established between those involved (Fairclough, 1995, p. 5).  It should be 
noted that the QDA process requires some level of analyst subjectivity and how the reader 
understands the context of the article.  
 
Gazeta Wyborcza published an article on April 23, 2014 ,when the 173rd Airborne Brigade 
arrived to Poland entitled “American soldiers fly to Świdwin air base.” The article is one 
of the first describing the beginning of U.S. symbolic actions and reassurance to Poland 
following the Russian annexation of Crimea in spring of that year. The article opens with 
the number of American soldiers arriving for a joint exercise and outlines former President 
Donald Tusk’s assurance that the troops coming to Poland from the United States would 
increase “if needed.” It later reiterates the possibility of increasing troop numbers and 
extending presence, framing the arrival of U.S. troops as a promise of long commitment 
rather than immediate reaction to Russia’s aggression.  
The article establishes the relationships between various actors through the use of 
Tusk and U.S. Ambassador Stephen Mull’s quotes. U.S.–Polish relations are framed as 
“partnership,” “friendship,” and a relationship that both states can count on. In contrast, 
Russia’s actions are identified in Tusk’s words as a “confusion the east of the continent,” 
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which serves to minimize Russia’s influence as secondary and inferior to that of the United 
States. The article with a quotation that plays into domestic debate: Tusk reaffirms that 
Poland can no longer be regarded as a second-class member of the alliance. This represents 
an element of Polish identity: a fear that the West regards Poland as undeserving of its 
status in the EU and NATO. It seeks to appeal to the Polish pride in its contributions to the 
shared values that define the West: “freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights” to 
secure a “safe and free republic.” Overall, the article strongly represents U.S. reassurance 
and deterrence message communicated through the military in a symbolic display. The 
article also indicates that Poland, its government especially, is open to such signs of 
commitment, and perceives the United States as a friend and reliable partner.  
 
“The cavalry are here. American troops ride through Poland” published March 22, 2015, in 
Newsweek covered the first iteration of Operation Dragoon Ride, one of the military’s key 
public diplomacy events. The article opens with a quote from the Minister of Defense 
informing Poland that “we can get used to the presence of American soldiers,” a statement 
that also appeared in the first article analyzed. The reason for the U.S. military presence is 
assumed in the article. Only towards the end is Russia mentioned, when it is described with 
negatively connotated words like “aggression” and “annexation.” This description’s 
language is charged with Polish historical memory, as it only gained independence from 
Soviet repression three decades ago after nearly a century. 
The author (anonymous) turns the discussion of a single event to an ongoing 
domestic debate. The article posits a question: “Does this mean that from now on the 
American army will be permanently stationed in Poland?” This question integrates the 
discussions of a potential American base in Poland that have been a crucial topic in 
conversations about Polish national security. A U.S. military in base in Poland represents 
an element of Poland solidifying its image as westward-orientated while reaffirming a 
relationship with an actor Poland views as the counterbalance to its adversary, Russia. It 
also builds upon an element of Poland’s construction of its image alluded to in the analysis 
of the previous article: Poland’s desire to be seen as a first-class member of the NATO 
alliance. Hosting a base would reposition NATO strategic activities away from Brussels 
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and more to its “eastern flank,” a move beneficial to Poland’s security, political clout, and 
economy.  
Throughout the text, the article identifies the United States with associated imagery 
of soldiers and tanks. How the military is represented within the article aligns with what 
the military amplifies as part of the messaging strategy: the appeal of soldiers in uniform 
and military equipment. The photo that accompanies the article features a Stryker tank, 
representing one element of the military’s message that aims to display heavy military 
equipment as a means of reassuring Polish publics. It is supplemented by a description of 
the event as one that attracted high numbers of residents who all wanted selfies with 
soldiers and had positive comments: “I like everything. Even the guys from the military 
police. Their uniforms.” The article ultimately frames the event in what it means for 
Poland: “more” exercises, rotations, and NATO troops.  
 
The second shorter article on Dragoon Ride appeared in Fakt on March 24, 2015, entitled 
“American soldiers arrive to Białystok.” The subheading sets the characterization of the 
U.S. military throughout: “they were welcomed like saviors.” It continues with describing 
the scene of the tanks rolling into town with “crowds of Bialystok residents” arranging a 
“royal welcome” for the American soldiers. It even continues to describe the convoy of 
soldiers being “welcomed as though they were liberating the city.” The article sets up the 
relationship between the Polish residents and American soldiers as one of friendship, yet 
implies an imbalance, framing Poland as vulnerable to some sort of occupation and 
American soldiers as liberators. This echoes descriptive elements found in reporting on 
U.S. and other allied troops liberating parts of Europe after Nazi occupation.  
The article identifies the reason for U.S. presence clearly, supplementing the 
imagery of the soldiers as “liberators,” with stating in the subheading that the residents see 
Americans the only hope to deter a Russian attack on Poland. The value of the U.S. 
military in Poland is perceived through a security frame, describing Dragoon Ride as a 
“symbol of a security guarantee for us.” The general tone of the article contrasts the more 
serious dailies and weeklies, like Newsweek and Gazeta Wyborcza, as Fakt is a tabloid-
style news outlet. It uses more conversational descriptions, such as the depiction of 
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“crowds only like this on New Year.”  To summarize, although the language is more 
sensational, it still appears to interpret the public diplomacy event as a sign of U.S. 
commitment to strengthening Polish security.  
 
During the curation of articles for content analysis and subsequent qualitative discourse 
analysis, many articles reported on the Enhanced Forward Presence troops in the months 
following the Warsaw Summit and leading up to their January 2017 arrival. One of the 
only articles found framed the presence of EFP troops as a potential disadvantage to 
Poland was published in Gazeta Wyborcza by Joanna Dzikowska on November 9, 2016, 
titled “Americans under the shop won’t stick out. Who’s afraid of the U.S. Army in 
Świętoszów and Bolesławiec?”  
 The article initially uses narration to create the imagery of a Świętoszów, a Polish 
town, as calm, peaceful, simple, and small. The four paragraphs of description are 
followed by a sentence set to create contrast to the tranquil life of the Polish town: “in the 
beginning of the year they will live with a few thousand U.S. soldiers.” This sentence 
almost appears ominous as it is followed by a subheader and description of who the 
soldiers are and their purpose in Poland: “ready to fight.” The following subheader – “on a 
leash” – is followed by quotes from several residents that reveal indifference and 
opposition to the U.S. presence, including one that reveals a fear of being perceived as 
“run on an American leash.”  
Another resident is pleased with the potential of receiving U.S. dollars, but “would 
rather do business with the Russians.” A different interview supplements the idea of 
Russians being preferred over Americans as the Russian people do not want war and the 
U.S. army’s presence potentially provokes an unwanted conflict. The quotations reveal a 
different relationship between Russia and Poland than the majority of articles related to 
U.S. military public diplomacy. One even says the U.S. soldiers are no better than the 
Soviets: “look what they’re doing in their other wars.”  
 Overall, the selection of quotations reveals the perception of the future arrival of 
U.S. troops as a nuisance at best and as destabilizing at worst. The image of the U.S. 
military as a symbol of reassurance and credible deterrence is contrasted by residents’ view 
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of the soldiers as detracting from Poland’s overall security. The author herself approaches 
the topic more neutrally than the interviewees and she distantly identifies the U.S. soldiers 
with language that describes the nature of EFP and facts such as where the training is 
located. The article’s overall theme of potential disadvantages of U.S. troop presence is 
likely to offer a different perspective to the media hype after the Warsaw Summit and the 
government’s own enthusiasm to receiving such a large symbol of U.S. commitment to 
Polish security.  
 
On January 5, 2017, Marek Świerczyński from Polityka authored an article “The American 
army comes to Poland. And they’re staying for good.” The title again brings up an element 
of the debate on a permanent deployment of troops to Poland. Although the military 
routinely states that the deployments to Eastern Europe are rotational, not permanent 
stationing, the arrival of EFP troops clearly symbolizes something that is perceived as 
near-permanent U.S. commitment to Poland. The author opens with a positive frame of the 
event describing it “without a doubt, a historic moment”  and throughout the article 
emphasizes that “history is happening.” Świerczyński makes points of comparison with the 
last time a significant U.S. troop presence was present in Europe. The distinction is that 
Poland is now at the forefront of European security as operations for all of NATO’s eastern 
flank will be headquartered in Poland. This alludes to a point of pride discussed in the 
analysis of previous articles that Poland aims to become a core actor in Euro-Atlantic 
security, not a second-class NATO member. 
 The U.S. military is identified through a lengthy description of the assets it brings 
to Poland as part of EFP. It details the logistics of EFP: the type of equipment, routes, 
locations of deployment, and travel information. Overall the description of the military 
creates an image of a credible force that “recognizes Polish weakness” and decides to “take 
care of it themselves.” The U.S. military and the U.S. government are framed differently 
within the article. The presence of the troops is explicitly framed to “defend and deter” 
while the author discusses the Republicans in the U.S. and the uncertainty of Donald 
Trump’s attitude toward NATO. U.S. politicians Lindsey Graham and John McCain are 
mentioned – two figures positively regarded in Poland because of their hawkish stance 
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towards Russia. While Trump’s skepticism of NATO is never an element of official 
military messaging, the military seeks to convey its reputation as a security guarantor, 
regardless of politics. This appears to have worked, as the mention of Trump is followed 
by an indication of the U.S. “absolute commitment” to Poland. This article, partly due to 
its authorship, takes a favorable approach to the arrival of U.S. troops. It provides a 
political analysis of the event and positions the argument as contributing to the strength of 
Poland and NATO. 
 
The third article on the EFP troop arrival published in Rzeczpospolita by Janina Blikowska 
on February 2, 2017, is titled “The Lubuskie province counts on American soldiers to fuel 
the economy.” The lede paragraph sets the tone for the rest of the article: “thanks to the 
American army a Lubuskie town has a new chance,” which immediately sets up the U.S. 
military’s identity in a positive way. It continues asserting that not only will prosperity 
increase and infrastructure improve, but the U.S. army also brings a better atmosphere. In 
contrast to the majority of articles coded in content analysis that perceive the U.S. military 
as a security guarantor, the presence of U.S. troops is perceived as benefiting Poland’s 
economy. The image of the U.S. military is positive, as the author notes the welcoming 
celebration in Żagań and Skwierzyna and the already high numbers of employment. The 
relationship is set up as mutually beneficial to the residents of the town and the U.S. army. 
The town receives additional government spending to support infrastructure development 
and greater investment from soldiers spending their salaries locally. A Polish official also 
notes that the opinions of the residents are positive because they feel safer. In turn, the U.S. 
military receives a community atmosphere full of “cheerful, open people.”  
 While the focus of the article frames the presence of the U.S. soldiers as added 
economic value, the perception of the U.S. military also includes descriptions of “nice and 
friendly” soldiers who are open to learning Polish. This supplements an interviewee’s point 
that, in contrast to traditional public diplomacy, each soldier is an ambassador of the 
United States to a foreign community. The article also makes no allusions to Russia or the 
threat towards Poland’s eastern flank, but the assumption of threat is implicit that the 
military is there to secure Poland and make the residents feel safer. The piece is not 
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explicitly reflecting the U.S. military’s message, yet increases its overall effectiveness in 
achieving favorable perceptions because of the economic value analyzed.  
 
Operation Saber Strike 2017 is covered by Maciej Nowakowski in Gazeta Wyborcza on 
June 17, 2017, in a piece called “B52s and B1s, the biggest bombers in the word in 
Mazury. NATO maneuvers.” The article is mostly detail-oriented in the beginning, 
outlining what exercise Saber Strike is and discusses the number of soldiers from each 
country and type of military equipment. The annual exercise is “nothing new in the Baltic” 
and helps militaries train to react quickly to threats on the eastern flank. While the 
cooperative nature of the exercise is mentioned, the relationship between various actors 
involved in the story is not established. Again, the image of the military is created through 
descriptions of military maneuvers and equipment, such as the strategic advantages of B-2 
bombers with stealth technology. As the article describes training, such as rapid-fire drills 
and bomber flights, social media posts with videos and pictures are embedded to 
emphasize the visual element of the military exercise. In general, this article most likely 
appeals to those with an interest in tactical military operations and heavy equipment and 
weapons, as it provides no analysis of the exercise and what it means for Poland, apart 
from securing the eastern flank.  
 
In summary, the qualitative discourse analysis builds upon the content analysis and 
confirms that the U.S. military is effectively communicating its message through public 
diplomacy. The photos that accompany each article are also worth mentioning. In each of 
the seven articles, military equipment and/or U.S. soldiers in uniform are depicted. Four 
show U.S. tanks, while others depict soldiers in fatigues on training fields or during a 
military exercise ceremony. While the selected articles are not fully representative of the 
Polish media landscape, they prove that the U.S. military is effectively communicating to 
the Polish public messages of absolute commitment in the face of potential Russian 
aggression.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to understand what the U.S. military seeks to convey to Poland through 
its public diplomacy activities, and how Polish news outlets perceive the message. 
Through a research process that involved field interviews and text analysis from both 
actors – the United States and Poland – the thesis was able to determine that the message 
of reassurance and deterrence the U.S. military aims to communicate to Poland is in fact 
received and perceptions in Polish news outlets are favorable. The selection of articles 
from a sample of Polish news outlets reveal that the U.S. military presence in Poland adds 
value not only  in terms of security and safety, but also in economic benefits. The thesis 
also found that the image of the U.S. military plays an especially important role in public 
diplomacy. The military’s material capabilities, especially its visible and tactical assets, 
contribute to the design and emphases of public diplomacy activities. Heavy, expensive 
machinery and soldiers in uniform represent the U.S.–Polish friendship, the United States’ 
absolute commitment to Polish and NATO security, and provide an attractive visual for the 
military to boost (and for the Polish media to disseminate). In other words, this confirms 
the constructivist assertion that a state’s material capabilities become endowed with 
meaning that influence perceptions and behavior.  
 
In addition to finding that the U.S. military’s public diplomacy effectively convinces 
Poland of the seriousness of America’s commitment to reassurance and deterrence, this 
thesis also demonstrates the important role of the military in conducting a state’s foreign 
policy. Rather than serving only as an instrument of power projection,  the military also 
can conduct strategies to contribute to the United States’ soft power potential. Military 
public diplomacy does not fit neatly into the categories either of  hard power or soft power, 
yet occupies a combination of the two that can be answered by analyzing perceptions and 
images. The results of the thesis have practical implications for convincing policymakers 
of the potential added value of the military in conveying a message. 
 
Moreover,, constructivism proves a valuable theoretical construct in creating a linkage 
between perception and soft power to apply to military public diplomacy. Rather than 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
positioning concepts from the realist and liberalist schools of thought  in conflict with 
constructivism, this case reveals a degree of compatibility among these theoretical 
frameworks to answer questions regarding military public diplomacy. This linkage can 
benefit the academic field of public diplomacy, and shows that the military is a valid actor 
that should be considered more seriously in public diplomacy literature. Other cases of 
militaries conducting public diplomacy can adopt constructivist assertions to identify  
messaging strategies – and to analyze their real-world  effectiveness.  
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APPENDIX I. CODEBOOK      
 
Code and Subcode Definition and When to Use/Not to Use 
 
Category: Descriptive 
1: Event Discussed What is the topic of this article that is relevant to my thesis subject? It is 
not the topic of the article overall but one of the public diplomacy events 
chosen to sample articles. 
a. Airborne Brigade  In 2014, the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived from Vincenza, Italy, 
following Russian aggression in Crimea. This was the first major U.S. 
symbol of reassurance. 
b. Dragoon Ride Dragoon Ride is discussed in the interviews as one of the best military 
public diplomacy events in Poland and the Baltic states. Dragoon Ride is a 
roadmarch from Vilseck, Germany, to Tallinn, Estonia, and vice versa. 
Dragoon Ride is under the umbrella of the U.S.-led Saber Strike exercise 
but a separate event from live-fire drills, etc.  
c. Saber Strike  Saber Strike is a longstanding annual U.S.-led multinational military 
exercise in which Poland takes part that aims to improve interoperability 
and readiness. 
d. EFP Troops Arrival  Enhanced Forward Presence troops from the U.S. arrived to Poland in 
January 2017 as part of NATO’s commitment from the 2016 summit in 
Warsaw.  
e. Road Accident Major public diplomacy failures have not been covered by the Polish 
media as such, but occasionally in the article sampling process, articles 
about road accidents involving deployed U.S. soldiers appeared.  
f. Combination Subcode to use when one event does not appear as the primary focus of the 
article but two or more are mentioned.  
 
Category: Descriptive 
2: Attitude Toward U.S. Military 
Activity/Presence 
What is the general tone of this article toward the U.S. military and its PD 
activities in Poland? This code is applied to the attitude directed at the U.S. 
military, not the tone of the article as a whole.  
a. In Favor The article is explicitly in favor of U.S. military PD activities and presence 
in Poland.  
b. Positive The article is positively inclined toward the PD event, mentioning 
beneficial outcomes.  
c. Neutral The article reports more on facts than takes a strong position in favor or 
against.  
If an event is discussed in the context of a negative topic but it not 
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negatively positioned itself (vice versa with positive) then it is considered 
neutral. 
d. Negative The article is negatively inclined toward the PD event, mentioning 
negative outcomes.  
e. Against The article is explicitly against of U.S. military PD activities and presence 
in Poland.  
 
Category: Message 
3: Primary Message from U.S. 
Military Activity/Presence 
What do the military PD events symbolize to Poland? What is the message 
of the PD activities?  
a. U.S. Assurance The article discusses the PD event in the context of the U.S. reassuring 
Poland and NATO’s eastern flank.  
b. Deterring Russia The article discusses the PD event in the context of deterring Russia from 
further aggression.  
c. NATO Assurance The article discusses the PD event in the context of the NATO. reassuring 
Poland and NATO’s eastern flank. 
Other NATO Allies are mentioned as contributing to assurance. 
d. U.S. Assurance and Deterrence The article discusses the PD event both as the U.S. reassuring Poland and 
Allies as well as deterring Russia. . 
e. NATO Assurance and Deterrence The article discusses the PD event both as NATO reassuring Poland and 
Allies as well as deterring Russia.  
f. None/Other No clear message can be interpreted from the article OR another message 
is present that is not significant to this study. 
 
Category: Message 
4: Value of U.S. Military Activity 
and Presence 
What do U.S. military public diplomacy activities and presence in Poland 
mean for Poland? What are the benefits or disadvantages?  
a. Strengthens National Security U.S. military PD will help Poland’s security. For example, training U.S. 
and Polish soldiers together will improve the army.  
b. Benefits Society and Economy U.S. military PD will contribute to a better Poland in terms of social and 
economic benefit, such as spending dollars or hiring people.  
c. Destabilizes Region U.S. military PD will strain relations with Russia and will harm Poland.  
d. Relates to Domestic Political 
System 
U.S. military PD is important for domestic political reasons. For example, 
if the article discusses which government or party is responsible for 
ensuring U.S. troops come to Poland.  
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e. None Present No clear value can be interpreted from the article.  
f. Combination Combination of benefits or disadvantages discussed in article. For 
example, if the arrival of U.S. soldiers will bring more security but will 
cost Poland.  
 
Category: Message 
5: Article Use of Including U.S. 
Troop Numbers or Type of 
Military Equipment 
Does the article mention how many U.S. troops or what type of U.S. 
military equipment is present in Poland? 
a. Troop Numbers The number of U.S. troops present at an event or in Poland is mentioned. 
b. Equipment Type The type of U.S. military equipment is mentioned.  
c. Both Both the numbers of U.S. troops and the type of military equipment are 
mentioned.  
d. Not Present Neither numbers nor type are present in the article. 
 
Category: Threat Perception 
6: Threat to Poland – Is Russia 
Mentioned? 
Is Russia mentioned in the article as a threat to Poland, either directly or 
indirectly?  
a. Explicitly Russia or Russians mentioned by name. 
b. Implicitly Russia is referred to in other words than by name, such as the term “eastern 
flank” that is used almost exclusively to refer to NATO’s borders with 
Russia.  
c. No Threat Russia is not considered a threat.  
d. Not Present There is no mention of Russia.  
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APPENDIX II. CODING INDEX 
 
SOURCE 
Original Title Translated Title  Date 
(DD.MM.YY) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
DO RZECZY 
Amerykanie nad Wisłą Americans on the Vistula 18.01.17 D B D A 
D 
C B 
Amerykańscy żołnierze w drodze do 
Polski. Oficjalne powitanie w sobotę 
American soldiers on the road to 
Poland. Official welcoming on 
Saturday 
10.01.17 D C E A C A 
Amerykańscy żołnierze wylądowali na 
lotnisku we Wrocławiu 
American soldiers land at the 
Wrocław airport 
07.01.17 D C A A C D 
Amerykański konwój już w Polsce. 
Powitanie na granicy 
The American convoy is now in 
Poland. Welcoming on the border 
12.01.17 D C E A C A 
Inauguracja polsko-amerykańskich 
ćwiczeń. Prezydent: To przełomowa 
chwila 
The inauguration of the Polish–
American exercise. President: This 
is a breakthrough moment 
30.01.17 D C A A C D 
Kilka tysięcy żołnierzy na manewrach 
Saber Strike w Orzyszu. "Stanowią one 
gwarancję bezpieczeństwa Polski" 
A few thousand soldiers at the Saber 
Strike maneuver in Orzysz. “They 
are a guarantee of Poland’s 
security” 
17.06.17 C C E A C B 
Macierewicz: Za tydzień amerykańska 
brygada pancerna będzie już w Polsce 
Macierewicz: In a week the 
American armored brigade will be 
in Poland 
06.01.17 D C A A A D 
MON podaje przyczynę wypadku 
amerykańskiej ciężarówki 
Defense Chief gives the cause of the 
accident with American heavy 
equipment 
22.01.17 D C F E B D 
Pierwszy trening Amerykanów. 
Abramsy strzelają na poligonie w 
Żaganiu 
First training of the Americans. 
Abrams shooting on the training 
field in Żagan 
18.01.17 D C D A C A 
Ponad trzy tysiące amerykańskich 
żołnierzy już w Polsce 
Around three thousand American 
soldiers are now in Poland 
26.01.17 D C D A A A 
 
FAKT 
250 amerykańskich żołnierzy już w 
Polsce 
250 American soldiers now in 
Poland 
07.01.17 D C D A C D 
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Amerykańscy żołnierze weszli do 
Białegostoku 
American soldiers enter Białegostok 24.03.15 B B A A D D 
Amerykańska brygada jedzie do 
Europy! Co to oznacza dla Polski? 
An American brigade is coming to 
Poland! What does this mean for 
Poland? 
31.03.16 D C D A C A 
Amerykańskie wojska przejechały przez 
południe Polski 
The American army drove through 
south Poland 
29.03.15 B C A E D D 
Bez lodów nie walczymy – 
amerykańscy żołnierze w Polsce! 
Without ice cream we’re not 
fighting – American soldiers in 
Poland! 
25.03.17 D B F B D D 
Ciężka brygada NATO wkroczy do 
Polski 
NATO armored brigade enters 
Poland 
26.10.16 D C E A A A 
Ford wjechał w amerykański konwój! A Ford ran into an American 
convoy! 
25.03.15 B 
 
B F E B D 
Macierewicz na wizji ujawnił, kiedy 
Amerykanie wkroczą do Polski 
Macierewicz revealed the vision, 
when the Americans will enter 
Poland! 
06.01.17 D C D A C A 
NATO szykuje się na wojnę? Is NATO preparing for war? 26.10.16 D B E A D A 
Polska firma wypierze amerykańskie 
brudy! 
Polish firm washes American dirt! 13.12.16 D C A B C B 
Tak sojusznicy pomogą Polsce! How the alliance helps Poland! 17.08.16 D A E A C D 
Wypadek wojskowej ciężarówki na 
„trasie śmierci”. Na miejscu 
Amerykanie 
An accident of heavy equipment on 
the “death road.” On the scene, 
Americans 
21.01.17 D C F E B D 
Żołnierze USA jadą do Polski U.S. soldiers are coming to Poland! 14.08.14 D B D A C A 
 
 
GAZETA PRAWNA 
Amerykańscy żołnierze z 2. Pułku 
Kawalerii odwiedzili Tarnów 
American soldiers from the 2nd 
Cavalry Regiment visit Tarnow 
31.05.16 B C A A C D 
Inwazja zielonych ludzików z NATO: 
Tysiące żołnierzy na polskich 
poligonach 
Invasion of green men from NATO: 
Thousands of soldiers on Polish 
training fields 
29.01.15 C C C A B B 
Lubuskie: Amerykański konwój 
wojskowy wjechał do Polski 
Lubuskie: An American army 
convoy entered Poland 
12.01.17 D C A A C D 
Macierewicz: Amerykańska brygada 
pancerna przybędzie do Polski 12 
Macierewicz: The American 
armored brigade will arrive to 
05.01.17 D C D A C A 
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stycznia Poland January 12 
Macierewicz: Saber Strike świadczy o 
sile i skuteczności NATO i USA 
Macierewicz: Saber Strike testifies 
to the strength and efficiency of 
NATO and the USA 
16.06.17 C C C A B D 
Macierewicz: W Polsce będzie 
stacjonowało 7 tys. amerykańskich i 
NATO-wskich żołnierzy 
Macierewicz: 7000 American and 
NATO soldiers will be stationed in 
Poland 
12.01.17 D C D A C A 
Marsz Dragonów: Amerykańskie 
transportery zbliżają się do polskich 
granic 
Dragoon Ride: American transports 
are approaching the Polish border  
23.03.15 B C A A B D 
Pierwsi amerykańscy żołnierze już w 
Polsce. To część pancernej brygady, 
która wzmocni wschodnią flankę 
NATO 
The first American soldiers in 
Poland. It’s a part of the armored 
brigade that will strengthen 
NATO’s eastern flank 
07.01.17 D C A A C B 
Siemoniak: Armia na wschodzie Polski 
zostanie wzmocniona 
Siemoniak: The army on Poland’s 
east will be strengthened 
23.03.15 B C A A B B 
Szef BBN: 13 kwietnia powitanie 
batalionu NATO w Orzyszu 
National Security Chief: A welcome 
for NATO in Orzysz on April 13 
10.03.17 D C C A C D 
Szef MON obserwuje ćwiczenia 
sojusznicze Saber Strike 17 
Defense Chief observes allied 
exercise Saber Strike 17 
16.06.17 C C C A D D 
Waszczykowski: pierwsi żołnierze 
brygady pancernej USA w Polsce w 
najbliższych dniach 
Waszczykowski: the first soldiers of 
the U.S. armored brigade in Poland 
in the coming days 
05.01.17 D C A A 
D 
D A 
 
GAZETA WYBORCZA 
31 tys. żołnierzy NATO ćwiczy w 
Polsce, jak nas bronić przed agresją 
Czerwonych 
31 thousand NATO soldiers 
exercise in Poland, how to defend 
us from the Reds’ aggression 
07.06.16 C C C A C D 
Ambasador USA w Polsce Stephen 
Mull skoczył ze spadochronem z 
polskimi żołnierzami 
U.S. Ambassador to Poland Stephen 
Mull jumped with a parachute with 
Polish soldiers 
08.09.16 A C A A B D 
Amerykanie pod sklepem nie będą 
wystawać. Kto się boi US Army w 
Świętoszowie i Bolesławcu? 
Americans will not stand under the 
shop. Who’s afraid of the U.S. 
Army in Świętoszów and 
Bolesławiec? 
09.11.16 D D F B
C 
C A 
Amerykańscy żołnierze już w Polsce. W 
Żaganiu zabrzmiały dwa hymny 
American soldiers are in Poland. In 
Żagan sounded two hymns  
12.01.17 D C A A C D 
Amerykańscy żołnierze przylecieli do 
bazy w Świdwinie 
American soldiers fly to the base in 
Świdwin 
23.04.14 A C A A A B 
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B52 i B1, największe bombowce świata, 
nad Mazurami. Manewry NATO 
B52s and B1, the biggest bombers 
in the world, are in Mazury. NATO 
maneuvers  
17.06.17 C C C A C D 
Pentagon: Amerykanie są gotowi 
rozlokować ciężką broń w państwach 
bałtyckich i Europie Wschodniej 
Pentagon: Americans are ready to 
deploy heavy weapons to the people 
of the Baltics and Eastern Europe 
13.06.15 C C D A C A 
Rekordowa frekwencja w Muzeum 
Powstania Warszawskiego 
Record numbers in the Warsaw 
Uprising Museum 
31.12.15 B B F B A D 
Siła Sojuszu w Polsce. Moskwa 
wściekła za tworzenie u nas "małej 
kwatery NATO" 
The strength of the Alliance in 
Poland. Moscow is furious for 
creating a “small NATO” with us 
19.06.16 C C E A D A 
Składy broni w Polsce. Co przywiozą 
Amerykanie? 
Types of weapons in Poland. What 
will the Americans bring? 
10.10.15 D C D A C A 
Trwają "przygotowania na najgorsze". 
Według analityków Rosja i NATO 
trenują przed wojną 
“Preparing for the worst” underway. 
According to analysts Russia and 
NATO are training before war  
12.08.15 C C E A D A 
Umiarkowana amerykańska inwazja w 
ramach prawa 
Moderate American invasion is 
under the law 
29.03.15 B C F E C A 
Wojska NATO w Olsztynie. Żołnierzy 
witały tłumy 
NATO army in Olsztyn. Crowds 
welcome the soldiers  
09.06.16 B B A A B A 
 
NEWSWEEK 
Amerykańska kawaleria pancerna 
przybyła do Polski 
An American armored brigade 
arrived to Poland 
26.09.14 A C A A C D 
Amerykańskie czołgi przyjadą bronić 
Europy Wschodniej. USA wysyłają 
brygadę pancerną 
American tanks are coming to guard 
Eastern Europe. The U.S. is sending 
an armored brigade 
30.03.16 D C D A
D 
C A 
Przybyła kawaleria. Amerykańskie 
oddziały jadą przez Polskę 
The cavalry is here. American 
troops are driving through Poland 
15.03.15 B C D A B A 
Rząd zabiega o utworzenie baz 
amerykańskich w Polsce 
The government seeks an American 
base in Poland 
24.03.15 B C A A
D 
C D 
Tusk: Do Polski może przyjechać 
więcej żołnierzy USA 
Tusk: More U.S. soldiers can come 
to Poland 
23.04.14 A C A A A D 
USA wysyła żołnierzy do Polski The U.S. sent soldiers to Poland 22.04.14 A C A A A D 
Wiemy, gdzie w Polsce będą 
stacjonowali żołnierze NATO 
We know where the NATO soldiers 
will be stationed 
15.06.16 D C E A C B 
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POLITYKA 
 
Amerykanie wzmacniają obecność 
militarną w Polsce. Przyślą więcej 
sprzętu 
Americans are strengthening their 
military presence in Poland. The 
will send more equipment 
29.04.17 D A A A
D 
B A 
Amerykańscy żołnierze w polskich 
bazach wojskowych 
American soldiers in Polish army 
bases 
25.04.17 D B
D 
A D C A 
Amerykańskie wojska wjeżdżają do 
Polski. I zostaną na stałe 
The American army is entering 
Poland. And they’re staying 
permanently 
05.01.17 D A D A C A 
Pentagon: Amerykanie będą ćwiczyć w 
Polsce 
Pentagon: Americans will train with 
Poland 
23.04.14 A A D A C A 
Pierwszy batalion NATO dotarł do 
Orzysza. Opancerzonymi strykerami, w 
trudnych warunkach 
The first NATO battalion reached 
Orzysz. Armored Strykers in 
difficult conditions 
31.03.17 D C F E B D 
 
 
RZECZPOSPOLITA 
 
Amerykanie jadą przez Polskę Americans are driving through 
Poland 
25.03.15 B B D A C A 
Amerykańscy żołnierze w Polsce muszą 
przestrzegać polskiego prawa 
American soldiers in Poland must 
abide by Polish law 
12.01.17 D D F D D D 
Amerykańskie wojska w drodze do 
Polski 
The American army is on the road 
to Poland 
15.12.16 D C D A C A 
Amerykańskie wojska w Polsce to nowe 
miejsca pracy i rozwój usług 
The American army in Poland and 
it’s new jobs and services 
02.02.17 D A A B B D 
Amerykańskie wojsko przejedzie przez 
Polskę 
The American army is driving 
through Poland 
22.03.15 B C A A B D 
Kanadyjska piechota nad Pustynią 
Błędowską 
The Canadian infantry over the 
Pustyn desert 
05.05.14 A C A A C D 
Pancerne i rakietowe wzmocnienie 
flanki 
Armor and rockets strengthen the 
flank 
19.03.15 B C A A C B 
Pokaz sojuszniczej solidarności NATO 
z Polską 
A display of allied NATO solidarity 
with Poland 
20.03.17 F C E A C A 
Rajd kawalerzystów Ride of the cavalry 30.05.16 B C C A C A 
Rekord Muzeum Powstania Record in the Warsaw Uprising 03.01.16 B B F B A D 
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Warszawskiego Museum 
Województwo Lubuskie liczy, że 
amerykańscy żołnierze napędzą 
gospodarkę 
The Lubuskie province counts on 
American soldiers to fuel economy 
02.02.17 D A A B B D 
W Polsce przybywa żołnierzy USA American soldiers arrive to Poland 26.03.14 A C A A C B 
Żagań to nie tylko US Army Żagan is not only the U.S. Army 02.02.17 D B C B C B 
Żołnierze NATO poznają Mazury jako 
turyści 
NATO soldiers get to know Mazury 
as tourists 
05.07.17 D A A B A D 
Żołnierze USA nie płacą za paliwo w 
Polsce 
U.S. soldiers don’t pay for gas in 
Poland 
12.06.16 C B
D 
C D A B 
Żołnierze USA od 1 kwietnia będą 
chronić polską granicę wschodnią 
U.S. soldiers will guard Poland’s 
eastern border from April 1 
21.03.17 D C E A C A 
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APPENDIX III. QUALITATIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ARTICLES 
Format: 
Source, Data 
Polish Title, Translated Title 
Author (if applicable) 
 
Gazeta Wyborcza, April 23, 2014 
“Amerykańscy żołnierze przylecieli do bazy w Świdwinie”; “American Soldiers fly to 
Świdwin air base” 
 
Newsweek, March 22, 2015 
“Przybyła kawaleria. Amerykańskie oddziały jadą przez Polskę”; “The cavalry are here. 
American troops ride through Poland” 
 
Fakt, March 24, 2015 
“Amerykańscy żołnierze weszli do Białegostoku”; “American soldiers come to Białystok” 
 
Gazeta Wyborcza, November 9, 2016 
“Amerykanie pod sklepem nie będą wystawać. Kto się boi US Army w Świętoszowie i 
Bolesławcu?”; “Americans will not stand under the shop. Who’s afraid of the U.S. Army 
in Świętoszów and Bolesławiec?” 
Joanna Dzikowska 
 
Polityka, January 5, 2017 
“Amerykańskie wojska wjeżdżają do Polski. I zostaną na stałe”; “The American army is 
coming to Poland. And they’re staying for good” 
Marek Świerczyński 
 
Rzeczpospolita  
February 2, 2017 
“Województwo Lubuskie liczy, że amerykańscy żołnierze napędzą gospodarkę”; 
“Lubuskie province counts on American soldiers to fuel the economy” 
Janina Blikowska 
 
Gazeta Wyborcza, June 17, 2017 
“B52 i B1, największe bombowce świata, nad Mazurami. Manewry NATO”; “B52s and 
B1s, the biggest bombers in the world in Mazury. NATO maneuvers” 
Maciej Nowakowski 
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